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What's Mine is Mine but What's Yours is Ours:
IP Imperialism, the Right of Publicity, and
Intellectual Property Social Justice in the
Digital Information Age
Lateef Mtima*
"THAT the individual shall have full protection in person and in prop-
erty is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary
from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protec-
tion. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands
of society.",
PART 1: INTRODUCTION
The classic conflict over enforcement of intellectual property rights con-
tinues today as a struggle between the "IP haves" and the so-called "IP have-
nots."2 Those nations that have canonized the products of their creative and
innovative endeavors as forms of property insist that these boundaries be
held sacrosanct by all others. 3 The societies and communities that have not
applied such status to their cultural and inventive output, however, often re-
gard such restrictions as incomprehensible, unreasonable, or simply unfair.4
While there can be many reasons for hostility toward intellectual property
protection, a frequent cause is that intellectual property characterization and
Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law and Founder and Director
of the Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justices. I would like to
thank Zalika Headley, HUSL ' 12, for her research assistance in the preparation
of this article. Any errors are my own.
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890).
2. Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. 331, 403 (2003); See,
e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Do as I Say (Not as I Did): Putative Intellec-
tual Property Lessons for Emerging Economies from the Not So Long Past of
the Developed Nations, 64 SMU L. REV. 923, 924-25 (2011); Beryl R. Jones,
Symposium, An Introduction to the European Economic Community and Intel-
lectual Properties, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665, 687 (1992); Geoffrey R. Scott, A
Comparative View of Copyright as Cultural Property in Japan and the United
States, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 283, 357-58 (2006); Peter K. Yu, Three
Questions That Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual Property
Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 412 (2008).
3. See Jones, supra note 2, at 665.
4. See, e.g., Alexandra G. Watson, Note, International Intellectual Property
Rights: Do TRIPS' Flexibilities Permit Sufficient Access to Affordable HIW
AIDS Medicines in Developing Countries?, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
143 (2009).
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rights enforcement seem to be promoted and respected only when it serves
the interests of those invested in particular intellectual property regimes.5
While some scholars and commentators attempt to analyze and pose
solutions to these conflicts as problems of technological and cultural incom-
patibility (i.e., technologically and economically advanced societies naturally
appreciate the need for strong intellectual property ("IP") rights; unsophisti-
cated, developing societies do not get it, but with education they can be up-
lifted into the fold),6 the issue is really not that complex. Many
contemporary IP rights conflicts are simply the result of enduring attitudes of
5. See Yu, Three Questions That Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellec-
tual Property Debate, supra note 2, at 414 n.8.
6. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Rulemaking in the Global Capitalist
Economy, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT DOMAIN IN CONTEMPORARY
CAPITALISM 1, 3 (Birgitte Andersen ed., Routledge forthcoming 2012) (adapted
from Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827
(2007).), available at www.peteryu.com/andersen.pdf.; Cynthia M. Ho, Bi-
opiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts with Global
Patent Policies, 39 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 433, 533 (2006) ("[B]ecause [non-
Western] objections to patents sometimes stem from misunderstanding the un-
derlying science, as well as a misunderstanding of patent rights, providing pat-
ent owners with the ability to clarify issues would be in the best interests of
all."); Chidi Oguamanam, Beyond Theories: Intellectual Property Dynamics in
the Global Knowledge Economy, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 104, 119
(2009); Mark Schultz & Alec van Gelder, Creative Development: Helping
Poor Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 Ky. L.J. 79, 81 (2009)
("Most discussions about intellectual property and development tend to center
on high-level, somewhat abstract debates about technology transfer, relations
between rich and poor countries, the fairness of the international intellectual
property system, and concerns about distributive justice."); Yu, The Copyright
Divide, supra note 2, at 402 ("Copyright law has always been about stakehold-
ers. In the late nineteenth century, Anthony Trollope blamed American book
piracy on 'the book-selling leviathans.' A century later, Professor Jessica Lit-
man told us that '[t]he only way that copyright laws get passed in this country
is for all of the lawyers who represent the current stakeholders to get together
and hash out all of the details among themselves.' Since then, commentators
have discussed at length the gaps between the 'copyright-rich' and 'copyright-
poor' and between the haves and have-nots in the copyright system.... Today,
a copyright divide exists between those who have stakes in the existing copy-
right regime and those who do not. On one side of the divide are the stakehold-
ers, who are eager to protect what they have under the existing regime.... On
the other side of the divide are the nonstakeholders. These nonstakeholders
neither understand nor believe in the copyright system. . . . Unless the non-
stakeholders understand why copyright needs to be protected and until they
become stakeholders or potential stakeholders, they will not be eager to abide
by copyright laws or to consent to stronger copyright protection." (emphasis
added)).
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What's Mine is Mine
Western Imperialism.7 Summarily put: that which I possess, and which inci-
dentally provides me some measure of power, dominance, or other advan-
tage, should be afforded protected, property-right status, and that status
should be recognized and revered by universal law. On the other hand, that
which you possess, should I desire it, should be ecumenically acknowledged
as freely available to any and all who are capable of developing and applying
it to "productive" use (such as the use that I intend to undertake).8
In other words, what's mine is mine; what's yours is ours.
Today, such attitudes and policies of Western "IP Imperialism" not only
account for many international clashes over intellectual property rights and
protections, but also fuel many domestic IP controversies in the American
digital information society.9 Although the vested, corporate purveyors of in-
tellectual property commodities consistently call for stronger IP protections
whenever their property interests are at stake, when it comes to outsider in-
7. See Doris Estelle Long, Traditional Knowledge and the Fight for the Public
Domain, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 617, 620 (2006) ("One of the
interesting things in talking to indigenous peoples about the public domain is
the response they provide. The concept of the public domain does not currently
exist in many indigenous communities except in the form of 'your public do-
main' versus 'my cultural heritage.' When asked, indigenous peoples often
respond with the same question. 'How come "public domain" is my stuff?
Yours is copyrightable and mine is in the public domain. How did that hap-
pen?' The answer, of course, is that we have developed a nice approach to
protection. New works get protected. Their works have been around too long.
Therefore, we all get to use them."); Imperialism Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/imperialism (last visited Oct. 8, 2012)
("[T]he policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over
foreign countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies.").
8. See Christopher May, Commodifying the 'Information Age': Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, the State and the Internet, I SCRIPT-ED, no. 3, 2004, at 408, 411
(U.K.), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue3/May.doc
("[W]hile the [TRIPs] agreement imposes a complex and wide ranging set of
requirements on signatories, at the core is a particular set of norms regarding
the treatment of knowledge as property. These norms underpin the entire
agreement and are based on the notion that the private ownership of knowledge
as property is a major spur to continued economic development and social wel-
fare. They further emphasise the development of knowledge as an individual-
ised and proprietorial endeavour, and the legitimate reward of such
individualised effort. Most obviously TRIPs includes a robust norm of com-
modification of knowledge and information, which in itself should alert us to
the fact that the 'information age' is capitalist business-as-usual, utilising previ-
ously established legal structures to ensure that capitalists' ability to com-
modify important and profitable assets and resources continues into the so-
called 'information age.'").
9. Long, Traditional Knowledge and the Fight for the Public Domain, supra note
7, at 617-18.
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ventive or expressive endeavors, they typically take the opposite position.0
Public engagement in new technological uses for traditional, corporate-con-
trolled intellectual properties should be restricted and curtailed; unauthorized
commercial development and exploitation of newer and non-traditional intel-
lectual properties should be unrestricted and encouraged. And, if intellectual
property protection is to be extended into new areas, any attendant property
rights and interests should be made subordinate to the IP rights and other
interests that sustain and perpetuate the entrenched IP establishment.II
Some current conflicts in the still-developing field of publicity rights
provide illustrative examples of the IP Imperialist viewpoint. As a relatively
new and innately personal kind of intellectual property, publicity rights are
usually beyond the immediate reach of corporate IP entities. Consequently,
it is in the best interest of these entities for publicity rights to be narrowly
construed. The more narrow the scope of the right of publicity, the more
likely that many new and existing means for commercially misusing individ-
10. See Patrick Fogarty, Major Record Labels and the RIAA: Dinosaurs in a Digi-
tal Age?, 9 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 140, 141 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing,
17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26 (2003); Ankur Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive
Music Industry and the Case for Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribu-
tion of Music, 22 ToURo L. REV. 375, 384-85 (2006); Sara M. Ford, Note &
Comments, Compulsory Licensing Provisions under the TRIPS Agreement:
Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 946 (2000);
Michael Cieply, Support for Antipiracy Bill, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2011, 8:23
PM), available at http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/support-
for-antipiracy-bill/; David Leonhardt, The Real Problem With China, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/
business/economy/12leonhardt.html; Microsoft Calls for Stronger IP Protec-
tion, THOMASNET (May, 23 2011), http://news.thomasnet.com/companystory/
Microsoft-Calls-for-Stronger-IP-Protection-847229 (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
Many of these efforts have resulted in various amendments to American intel-
lectual property laws. See, e.g., Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006); Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006 (TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, & 35 U.S.C.); See also Preventing Real Online
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property (PROTECT
IP) Act of 2011, S.968, 112th Cong. (2011) (as introduced in Senate, May 12,
2011); Patent Reform (America Invents) Act of 2011, S.23, 112th Cong. (2011)
(as passed in Senate, Mar. 8, 2011).
11. See, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F. 3d 1134, 1140-41 (9th Cir.
2006) ; See also Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d
1146, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2010); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100
(9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir.
1988); Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717-718 (9th
Cir. 1970).
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ual personas and images will be held outside the parameters of the right, and
thus available for exploitation by anyone with the means to develop and
commercialize these uses.12 When new technological uses are introduced in
connection with intellectual property under corporate dominion, however, it
is vehemently argued that these uses should be relegated to the province and
control of the IP rights holder.13
This article discusses how IP Imperialism is a socially and politically
pernicious policy that contravenes the social utility and social justice objec-
tives underlying American intellectual property law, 14 including those mores
advanced through the right of publicity. Part II briefly discusses the origins
and evolution of IP Imperialism in the American intellectual property psyche
and its historical role in the formation of American IP law and policy.,5 Part
III focuses specifically on the right of publicity, its doctrinal facets and social
12. Anastasios Kaburakis, et al., NCAA Student-Athletes' Rights of Publicity, EA
Sports, and the Video Game Industry: The Keller Forecast, 27 ENT. & SPORTS
Law. no. 2, 2009, at 30, available at http://www.kaburakis.com/wp-content/
uploads/2009/09/kaburakis.pdf; Pete Thames, N.C.A.A. Fails to Stop Licensing
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/02/09/sports/ncaabasketball/09ncaa.html; Katie Thomas, Ex-Players
Join Suit vs. N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010, at B I5, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/I /sports/ncaabasketball/ 11 colleges.html.
13. Of course, this is not a new trend. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists TV,
Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1974); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998), holding modified by Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue
Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006);
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984);
Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 977
(N.D. Cal. 1999); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013
(9th Cir. 2001); i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir.
2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) and aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
14. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 10, at 77-78 ("[C]opyright industries have re-
peatedly exhibited a path-dependent resistance to licensing or engaging in new
technological methods of exploitation that might endanger their traditional
profit centers. Indeed, they have a long history of Seeking to reap monopoly
rents through anticompetitive collusion, blocking new entrants, and paying off
gatekeepers for consumer attention. In the multimedia and Internet contexts,
copyright industries have also engaged in protracted cross-sectoral turf battles,
leaving would-be licenSees with the highly complex, costly task of Seeking
multiple, overlapping permissions. This institutional conservatism and balkani-
zation does not inspire confidence that, if only given control, the industries
would make their full store of cultural expression readily available at reasona-
ble prices.").
15. See infra Part II.
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utility/social justice functions, and its potential to be utilized as a counter-
weight to the IP Imperialist agenda.16
In Part IV, four cases are analyzed as presenting important opportunities
to further IP social justice through the right of publicity. 17 The first three
cases demonstrate how such opportunities can be lost when courts fail to
consider the IP social utility and social justice functions of publicity rights.' 8
The fourth case, however, illustrates how IP social utility/social justice cog-
nizance can lead to more socially balanced (and counter-imperialistic)
outcomes. ' 9
Finally, Part V attempts to construct an IP social justice framework for
evaluating and resolving right of publicity claims.20 This Part delineates a
right of publicity social justice analytical spectrum, and identifies important
IP social justice issues and opportunities that courts should be sensitive to in
adjudicating right of publicity conflicts and disputes.21
PART II: THE RISE OF AMERICAN IP IMPERIALISM
A. Early American IP Policies: What's Yours is Ours
In America's nascent years, quasi-imperialistic attitudes22 toward intel-
lectual property rights were seen as serving the country's immediate interests
as a developing nation. The colonial pioneers did not have much intellectual
property of their own to protect, 23 but there was a storehouse of pre-existing
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., Case No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 131387 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009) (citation to original unpub-
lished order available from District Court; version available at 722 F. Supp. 2d
1148 not available at the time of authorship); Brooks v. Topps Co., 86
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, 448
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).
19. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part V.
22. While America's IP policies were certainly self-serving at this point, they were
only "quasi-imperialistic" given that (i) there was no "what's mine is mine"
element to those policies at this juncture, and (ii) the imperialistic element of
conquest was absent. Given the historical relationship between America and
her former colonial rulers, the misappropriation in this instance was more akin
to underage teens taking the keys to the family car without permission.
23. BILL IVEY, ARTS, INC.: How GREED AND NEGLECT HAVE DESTROYED OUR
CULTURAL RIGHTS 3 (2008) ("Before 1900 the American extension of [its] cul-
tural mainstream, when measured against its European antecedents, came up
short-a thin trickle compared to its Old World headwaters. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries the artistic achievements dotted across our hardscrab-
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protected material that could be critical to the new nation's cultural advance-
ment and technological development.24 The great works of literature and in-
novative technological achievements of the day were considered to emanate
from Europe, and the colonists did not see anything wrong with appropriat-
ing these achievements in the cause of American national progress.2 5 Having
fought a war to gain independence from British control, America's leaders
and populace were not overly concerned with the trivialities of foreign rights
in intangible property, especially if such rights stood in the way of nation
building.26 And surely if it seemed reasonable to capture, enslave, and other-
wise subjugate and degrade other people in the cause of American agricul-
tural and industrial "progress," the misappropriation of a few stories and
songs was hardly an affront to the national conscience.27
ble frontier didn't add up to anything approximating the scope and quality
found in Europe. True, colonial artisans designed a few gracefully rendered
utilitarian objects-well-crafted furniture and elegantly understated silverware
and serving pieces; in addition, some notable buildings executed in the classical
revival style were scattered through Washington, DC, and other big cities. A
few master painters of landscapes and portraits had emerged but not a unique
New World vision. America still measured itself against European leadership
in the visual arts.").
24. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 2, at 936-40 (discussing widespread American
IP piracy during the nation's formative era.); Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra
note 2, at 336-44 (same).
25. Such misappropriation policies, however, were a double-edged sword. See
IVEY, supra note 23, at 3 ("By the mid-1800s an indigenous American literary
voice could be heard, but even writers who had been at work for decades had
only begun to achieve recognition that approached that of their European and
English counterparts. (This situation was abetted by the widespread piracy of
English tiles by U.S. publishers. By ignoring copyright and paying no royalties
to European and British authors, prices of U.S. editions of foreign works were
consistently lower than their homegrown counterparts.)"); Yu, The Copyright
Divide, supra note 2, at 345.
26. See Charles H. Norchi, Symposium, The Legal Architecture of Nation-Build-
ing: An Introduction, 60 ME. L. REV. 281, 289 (2008) ("Nation-builders draft-
ing constitutional texts and codified laws must sift through both the myth
system and the operational code in order to determine which processes of com-
munity decisions are both authoritative and controlling. A newly drafted consti-
tution may be a myth while what people actually do in informal settings is the
accepted code of operation.").
27. See, e.g., KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 196-97 (1956) ("In the customary phraseology of the
ante-bellum codes, South Carolina's slaves were 'deemed, held, taken, reputed
and adjudged in law to be chattels personal, in the hands of their owners and
possessors and their executors, administrators and assigns, to all intents, con-
structions and purposes whatsoever.' Slaves had the attributes of personal
property everywhere, except in Louisiana (and Kentucky before 1852) where
2012] 329
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Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the Founding Fathers provided for
the granting of intellectual property rights in the very first article of the Con-
stitution,28 American disregard for the intellectual property rights of others
prevailed throughout the nineteenth century.2 9 As American inventors and
authors became increasingly prolific in their own inventive and creative out-
put, however, the attitudes toward protection for domestic innovative and
expressive works evolved and the social benefit of providing secular incen-
tives and rewards to authors and inventors began to be appreciated. With the
advent of revolutionary means of mass production and distribution of such
creations, the commoditization perception of intellectual property began to
take root in the American socio-economic psyche:
To bring the lively arts to an increasingly eager public, a new
American arts system and new "arts industries" grew dramatically
during the first three decades of the twentieth century .... Music
of all kinds made its way onto molded shellac 78 rpm discs, intro-
duced by Columbia Records in 1904; by 1921 record sales totaled
$16 million, a figure that would increase tenfold over the next
decade. In 1920 there were 20,000 silent movie theaters operating
across the country, screens fed, in mid-decade, by fifteen film stu-
they had the attributes of real estate."). Indeed, even as America began to ap-
preciate the need for protecting her own intellectual property, her domestic
intellectual property policies reflected the nation's imperialistic ancestry. See
also Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property
Law (With Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 717, 740-41 (2007) ("[Tlhe American patent system en-
couraged a more diverse composition of inventors through broadened access to
opportunities for investing in, exploiting, and deriving income from inventive
activity. However, because of the historical realities of race and slavery, the
extent of this beneficial distributive impact on black inventors was illusory at
best .... The early American patent system beckoned many poor white inven-
tors to achieve wealth and recognition through a quasi-egalitarian patent system
that facilitated investment in their lucrative ideas. The same opportunities did
not await black inventors, whose contributions white society tended to ignore
when the commercial value of a black invention was uncertain. In cases where
commercial promise was more readily apparent, black inventions were subject
to appropriation without attribution. State laws governing property and contract
expressly precluded slaves from applying for or holding property. Presumably,
this proscription included slaves being precluded from owning patents.").
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (bestowing upon Congress the authority "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
29. See, e.g., Steven Wilf, Copyright and Social Movements in Late Nineteenth-
Century America, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 123, 125 (2011). Indeed the
United States politely declined participation in the Beme Convention and simi-
lar international intellectual property treaties and agreements.
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dios. . . .But cultural change always exacts a price. The rise of
vernacular art made possible by technology enriched America's
expressive life, but the market-driven system producing films,
records, and broadcasts evolved with little attention to the way the
creation and distribution of art in America linked up to "Life, Lib-
erty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." The problem lay not with
these transforming technologies, and certainly not with the blues
musicians, movie stars, and vaudevillians who provided early cul-
tural "content." Instead, the public interest was subverted by the
business practices that made up the rules and laid out the playing
field for producing and consuming our modern mainstream
culture.30
Intellectual property protection became recognized as vital to American
technological and cultural progress, 31 and, moreover, safeguarding the means
of production and distribution of IP commodities would soon be regarded as
equally important as stimulating the production of intellectual property out-
put.32 And thus the American IP Commoditization Precept was born. Amer-
ican intellectual property law and policy would become dominated by
attitudes that regarded intellectual property works primarily as commodities
to be invested in and commercially exploited for profit.33 The aspirations
and innovations of human hearts and minds were reduced to mere chattel.
30. Ivey, supra note 23, at 7, 9.
31. Wilf, supra note 29, at 125-26.
32. Ivey, supra note 23, at 11-12 ("Movies, records, and broadcasts became
America's dominant expressive forms, but in most instances there was no sin-
gle 'author' of these new arts products. So who would own the musical or
dramatic content? The obvious answer was to place ownership and control of
the finished product-the film, radio show, or disc-with the corporation that
had assembled the creative team, financed the project, and distributed it to
audiences.... The groundwork was firmly in place to permit corporations to,
in effect, create and own the rights to new works of art .... Because corpora-
tions own or control some of the most representative and influential American
art products of the past one hundred years, it should be no surprise that ques-
tions of ownership, access, gatekeeping, and price continually challenge any
effort to understand and advance our cultural rights.").
33. See, e.g., Doris Estelle Long, "Democratizing" Globalization: Practicing the
Policies of Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 217, 218
(2002) ("Culture and intellectual property appear to have gotten a divorce dur-
ing the latter decades of the Twentieth Century."); Victoria F. Phillips, Sympo-
sium, Commodification, Intellectual Property and the Quilters of Gee's Bend,
15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 359, 370-75 (2007); May, supra note 8,
at 411 ("The rights of capitalists to commodify information and knowledge as
they See fit are ... regarded as the naturally 'just' rights of ownership. This
attempts to raise commercial rights to exploit information and knowledge to the
same level as human rights. Although this may be legitimate it is hardly un-
2012]
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B. America as IP Super-Power: What's Mine is Mine
Germinated in the latter years of the nineteenth century, the American
IP Commoditization Precept flowered into full-blown IP Imperialism in the
twentieth century. In the global market place, the United States not only took
its place in the international IP community,34 but became a staunch advocate
for the recognition of strong intellectual property rights, particularly as the
nation shifted from a goods-based economy to an information-based one. 35
controversial, given that sometimes the exercise of these commercial rights is
at the cost of the human rights of users."). These attitudes and policies directly
contradict the express social utility mandates of the Constitutional Intellectual
Property Clause. See, e.g., Lateef Mtima & Steven D. Jamar, Fulfilling the
Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitizing Textual Information, 55 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 77, 80-86 (2010); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis
for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter,
82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 183 (2009); Edward T. Saadi, Sound Recordings Need
Sound Protection, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 335-36 (1997) ("The United
States Constitution explicitly grants to Congress the power to pass laws gov-
erning copyright. The purpose behind this grant of authority is to encourage
the creation of works of artistic and scientific value by providing the incentive
of an exclusive monopoly over the benefits of that creation for a limited time.
The congressional purpose in granting these exclusive rights was purely utilita-
rian; it was not based upon the natural rights of authors in their works."); Stacy
F. Michelle Fowler, Note, To Protect and... To Profit: The Trademarking of
the LAPD as an Example of Expanding Intellectual Property Rights, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1623, 1627, 1632 (2001); McDonald, Comment, Copyright for Sale:
How the Commodification of Intellectual Property Distorts the Social Bargain
Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50 How. L.J. 541, 543 (2007).
34. See, e.g., May, supra note 8, at 410.
35. See, e.g., SHAYERAH ILIAS & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
34292, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 10-12
(2011), available at http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/eyeonwashington/2011/doc-
uments/iprtradeagreements.pdf; PETER DRAHOS, COMM'N ON INTELL. PROP.
RIGHTS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY STANDARD-SETTING, at 10, available at http://www.iprcommission.org/
papers/pdfs/study-papers/sp8_drahos-study.pdf ("The disappointments of the
1970s in intellectual property standard-setting led the US in the 1980s to adopt
a strategy of forum-shifting. . . . In fora such as WIPO, UNCTAD and
UNESCO, the US faced the problem that developing country blocs could de-
feat its proposals on intellectual property or advance their own. The US began
to argue the issue of intellectual property protection should become the subject
of a multilateral trade negotiation within the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). The GATT was a forum in which the US was the single most
influential player. Largely due to the efforts of the US and the US big business
community the Ministerial Declaration, which in 1986 launched the Uruguay
Trade Round, listed the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights as a
subject for negotiation."); Anita B. Frohlich, Copyright Infringement in the In-
ternet Age-Primetime for Harmonized Conflict-of-Laws Rules?, 24 BERKELEY
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Recognition of and respect for the expressive and innovative endeavors of
others, however, especially those of non-Western cultures, did not keep
pace. 36 Most incendiary to many third world and other developing nations
TECH. L.J. 851, 856 (2009) (noting that "[t]he accession of the United States to
the Berne Convention initiated a gradual reconsideration of international copy-
right law while contemporaneously creating new challenges when foreign cop-
yright law was involved."); Marshall Leaffer, International Copyright from an
American Perspective, 43 ARK. L. REV. 373, 383 (1990); May, supra note 8, at
410 ("In addition to the advantages to be gained by having a tougher multilat-
eral enforcement mechanism, the US government (alongside allies in the EU)
wanted to move the international regulation of IPRs into the new WTO (from
the WIPO) because their negotiators felt that they were more likely to gain
agreements to their advantage by linking these issues to the international trade
regime.);.Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Move-
ment, 30 REG. MAG., no. 5, 2007, at 36, 37, available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v3On3-6.pdf.
36. See ILIAS, supra note 35, at 28; DRAHOS, supra note 28, at 2 ("[With regard to]
developing countries['] [ability to] influence outcomes in the international in-
tellectual property standard-setting process . . . [developing countries] have
comparatively little influence. The main reason lies in the continued use of
webs of coercion by the US and EU, both of which remain united on the need
for strong global standards of intellectual property protection."); Marci A.
Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 615-16 (1996); Long, Traditional Knowledge
and the Fight for the Public Domain, supra note 7, at 617, 619 (2006) ("If you
were to ask me what the role of the United States is in the protection of the
traditional knowledge, I would essentially say 'not a whole lot."'); J. H.
Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and
Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989),
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle= 1400&
context=faculty-scholarship; Steve Lohr, New Economy: The Intellectual
Property Debate Takes a Page from 19th-Century America, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/14/business/new-econ-
omy-intellectual-property-debate-takes-page-I 9th-century-america.html. Vai-
ous commentators have explored this problem as one of "cultural imperialism,"
which is generally understood to denominate the externally imposed prioritiza-
tion of Western cultural values over competing values held by non-Western
cultures. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 6, 467-70 (employing the term "patent impe-
rialism" to reference the issue in the biopiracy context). While cultural imperi-
alism (and of course racism) provide the collective foundation for Western
colonialism and Post-War political imperialism, IP imperialism is only partially
derived from a false sense of racial and cultural superiority. IP imperialism
stratagems are further "legitimized" by unabashed self-interest coupled with a
deliberate cognizance of the concomitant power and resources to fuel those
interests. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Symposium, The Recognition of In-
digenous Peoples' and Community Traditional Knowledge in International
Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 281 (2001) ("To the extent that patents on
innovations derived from traditional knowledge may only be challenged after
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was the fact that the United States and the former Colonial Powers sought to
define unilaterally what would qualify as protectable intellectual property. 37
At the same time, they showed little respect for the sovereign and national
rights in the properties the West desired, such as the natural and indigenous
cultural resources they continued to pilfer from many non-Western countries
without even the pretense of fair compensation.38
they have been granted, an enormous financial and administrative burden is put
upon indigenous people and the NGOs that represent community interests. For
example, it took organized international ecofeminists five years and hundreds
of thousands of dollars to successfully challenge the Grace Company's neem-
based patents and they were dealing with a very clear case of appropriation of
widely known, published prior art. Although litigation serves an important
symbolic role in helping to focus the public's attention on this issue, continu-
ous monitoring and challenging of patents requires resources that are well be-
yond the capacities of all but the most well-funded NGOs."). From this
perspective, IP imperialism is not "inherently evil," but rather a quasi-aristo-
cratic principle of privilege and entitlement, perpetrated behind a fagade of
public interest and global uplift.
37. See Long, "Democratizing" Globalization: Practicing the Policies of Cultural
Inclusion, supra note 33, at 220-22, 224 ("[S]ince at least the negotiation of
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) as
part of the Uruguay Round under GATT, a growing divide between the forces
of 'traditional' copyright and those who seek broader protection for all cultural
works has opened. Debates over the right to protect works of cultural patri-
mony or indigenous art or literature under 'traditional' copyright, or even its
desirability continue with no clear indication of when a satisfactory conclusion
might be expected. This division is merely one example of a much broader rift
between developed and developing countries regarding the standards and scope
of works which should be subject to protection under domestic intellectual
property laws.... The North-South debates are also more problematic because
behind this division is a history of economic, political and cultural imperialism
that makes the power imbalance Seem not only unfair, but, more importantly,
an unfortunate continuation of past practices, albeit in a different guise."); Jo
Recht, Intellectual Property in Indigenous Societies: Culture, Context, Politics,
and Law, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 277, 282-83 (2008), ("Western assumptions
about ownership and authorship, and the assignment of most indigenous
knowledge to the 'public domain,' allow non-indigenous actors to create their
own protectible [sic], derivative subject matter from indigenous raw materials.
IPR is double-edged, and both edges cut off indigenous protections and rights.
Thus, a Western pharmaceutical company may appropriate indigenous knowl-
edge about a medicinal plant that is deemed by Western intellectual property
law to be in the 'public domain,' and then create commercial products to which
it has exclusive rights. The royalties go to the Western company rather than to
the indigenous keepers of the knowledge, and the exclusive rights that the com-
pany might apply for under Western patent law will make the end products
inaccessible to the indigenous population.").
38. See Recht, supra note 37, at 283 ("[Wlhen non-technological products are con-
sidered, such as songs, images, paintings, or other forms of traditional cultural
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Domestically there was little challenge to the IP Commoditization as-
pects of American IP Imperialism. For one thing, the American public
seemed to have access to as much IP products as it desired at affordable
prices.39 Additionally, there were few options available for interacting with
expression, outside actors, whether individual or corporate, can take indigenous
products deemed by Western law to be free to the public, and establish exclu-
sive rights in the derivative works created from them. This is not an accident:
the intellectual property system was expanded and developed in the nineteenth
century by the European imperial powers, who used it to preserve for them-
selves the resources of their colonies. In the contemporary context, one com-
mentator has noted that 'WIPO and TRIPS have focused on teaching the poor
how to protect the intellectual property of the West.' Conventional intellectual
property law, therefore, provides neither a sword nor a shield to protect indige-
nous subject matter."); May, supra note 5, at 419 ("While the powerful states
continue to ensure their capitalists' (intellectual) property is safe-guarded,
others will be increasingly threatened by the information age's commodifica-
tion of their remaining national resources by international Capital (through bio-
piracy and the 'theft' of traditional knowledge, for instance). Thus, the 'infor-
mation age' both enhances the power of states that can effectively control their
jurisdiction, and contributes to the weakness of those that do not."); See also
DRAHOS, supra note 35, at 8 ("The Berne system was run to suit the interests of
copyright exporters. Each successive revision of the Berne brought with it a
higher set of copyright standards. By the time many countries shed their colo-
nial status, they were confronted by a Berne system that was run by an Old
World club of former colonial powers to suit their economic interests. Former
colonial powers continued to watch over their former colonies. When eleven
Sub-Saharan states joined Berne they were 'so totally dependent economically
and culturally upon France (and Belgium) and so inexperienced in copyright
matters that their adherence was, in effect, politically dictated by the 'mother
country' during the aftermath of reaching independence.' "); Ho, supra note 6,
at 433, 505-06 ("Although there is technically no intellectual property in-
fringement in a country that does not have intellectual property laws-for one
cannot break a law that does not exist-industry advocates nonetheless suc-
cessfully claimed that piracy of intellectual property rights was occurring and
depriving the U.S. of its just profits. In other words, the piracy argument under-
lying enactment of TRIPS ignored the strict legal parameters of intellectual
property laws."); Penny Hess, All Diamonds are Blood Diamonds: The Truth
About the Diamond Trade, AFRICAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY COMM. at 1-2
(2006), available at http://apscuhuru.org/analysis/diamonds/diamondsweb.
pdf; Moyiga Nduru, Avocados, Diamonds at Core of Anti-Israel Trade Cam-
paign, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://
ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=3633 1.
39. IVEY, supra note 23, at 7-9 ("[N]ew 'arts industries' grew dramatically dur-
ing ... the twentieth century .... Today, DVDs, movies-on-demand, satellite
radio, the iPod, and ring-tones top off the transition begun a century ago:
Americans can engage the performing arts on our own terms, on our own time-
table, at home, in the car, or while strolling or jogging in the park. . . . And
today DVDs are released mere weeks-sometimes only a few days-after a
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IP products other than as pre-packaged, static commodities. Books, movies,
and music recordings were entertaining and often even inspiring;
pharmaceuticals were inexpensive and cured most routine ills; even the pub-
lic's favorite celebrities were "manufactured," managed, and marketed by
entertainment conglomerates.0 As with most mass-produced commodities in
the industrial age, the public had little say in how intellectual property prod-
ucts were manufactured or what products would be made available, nor could
it "tweak" or customize that which was offered to suit their individual lik-
ings. Like children at the end of a hyperactive summer day, the public hap-
pily consumed what was put in front of it, so long as it was familiar, or at
least superficially gratifying, unconcerned with either the ultimate cost or
process involved in the preparation of the intellectual property repast. Nor
did there seem to be any cause for alarm over growing corporate claims of
absolute dominion over the IP to which they held legal rights. In possession
of an ever-growing bundle of legal titles to IP works, what was theirs was
theirs and the right of control over their property was to be respected by all. 4'
C. Digital Information Technology: The Challenge to IP Imperialism
and Commoditization
The advent of digital information technology presented the first major
challenge to both American IP Imperialism policies and the American IP
Commoditization Precept. Through the Internet and related technological
advances, people in many non-Western and developing nations gained un-
precedented access to American intellectual property and began utilizing this
material as the building blocks for further expressive and innovative works.42
film has opened on the big screen. The cache of live theater and music on tour
persists, but most citizens consume most performing arts through some form of
technology-usually technology that delivers music, drama, and dance right
into the living room or the family car.").
40. The Hollywood Studio System in the Golden Age, HOLLYWOODMOVIEMEMO-
RIES.COM, http://www.hollywoodmoviememories.com/articles/hollywood-his-
tory/hollywood-studio-system-golden.php (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
41. In this regard, American IP Imperialism arguably grew to be even more so-
cially pernicious than its European progenitor, in that, in addition to its one
way nation state/cultural biases, the added feature of the IP Commoditization
Precept further serves to stagnate American cultural and innovation develop-
mental interests. See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, Symposium, Crafting Copyright
Law to Encourage and Protect User-Generated Content in the Internet Social
Networking Context, 19 WIDENER L.J. 843, 845 (2010).
42. See, e.g., Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement,
supra note 35, at 36, 42; Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of
Users: A Fair Use Doctrine For Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 108 (2001)
("[I]nformation technology has empowered ordinary users to become part of
the creative process both by its interactive nature and the very architecture of
the pennon of the information society, the Internet.").
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Concededly, this new access was sometimes abused to undertake unautho-
rized commercial exploitation and other acts of IP piracy.43 For American
and other Western IP stakeholders, the "what's mine is mine" imperialist
bastion was no longer an unassailable rampart.4 Moreover, some non-West-
43. ILIAS, supra note 35, at 12-15; Long, "Democratizing" Globalization: Practic-
ing the Policies of Cultural Inclusion, supra note 33, at 229 ("E-commerce, or
at least the promise of electronic commerce, has become the new paradigm for
globalization. While figures on Internet growth and its global penetration re-
main subject to dispute, the reality is that the growth of the Internet as a global
communication and marketing medium is unprecedented. Moreover, such pen-
etration is not limited to the so-called developed countries. To the contrary, of
the ten fastest growing countries for Internet penetration for the year 2001,
almost all of them are so-called developing countries.); Wendy M. Pollack,
Note, Tuning In: The Future of Copyright Protection for Online Music in the
Digital Millennium, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2445, 2445-46 (2000) ("Digitization
of copyrighted materials permits instantaneous, simplified copying methods
that produce nearly perfect copies of originals. These copies can be digitally
delivered to thousands of Internet users. Decentralization and anonymity in
cyberspace have allowed for the widespread dissemination of copyrighted
materials without permission from their owners."); China's Piracy Hurting Its
Own Industries, NBCNEwS.COM (July 7, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/1 3617619/ns/business-world business/t/chinas-piracy-hurting-its-own-in-
dustriesl.
44. See, e.g., Stephen M. Pinkos, Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, 112th Cong.
(2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/smallbusiness/pdfs/USPTOTesti-
mony-JudiciarySubcommittee on IntellectualProperty.pdf; Michael Wines,
China to Begin Crackdown on Pirated Software in 2011, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 8, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/business/global/
08piracy.html; Editorial, Internet Piracy and How to Stop It, N.Y. TiMES, June
9, 2011, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/opinion/
09thul.html. Moreover, some commentators have argued that such develop-
ing-nation unauthorized uses are not only equitable but a more effective means
of technology transfer when compared to policies of direct foreign aid. See
Gibbons, supra note 2, at 952, 954 ("[A] free marketplace in unlicensed intel-
lectual property is more likely to promote economic development in developing
countries than either direct foreign aid or incentivized technology transfer. Fur-
ther, one lesson that may be drawn from history is that those countries that
have successfully transitioned from developing or agricultural economies to
developed or industrial economies all did so during periods of lax or no trans-
national enforcement of intellectual property rights. In fact, the development
norm in history was not the enforcement of intellectual property rights but,
instead, the positive flouting of the intellectual property rights of non-citizens
as an aid to national development. . . . The question to be asked may be
whether unlicensed uses are more efficient in promoting developmental goals
than direct foreign aid or incentives for technology transfer. A market-driven
policy for intellectual property or technology transfer that permits access to and
use of intellectual property in response to market demand for technology or
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ern nations and various marginalized groups and communities would seize
upon Western "digital vulnerability" to gain bargaining leverage with which
to redress the "what's yours is ours" part of the IP Imperialism equation,45
and to otherwise explore digital information technology as a means for ad-
dressing other intellectual property social deficiencies and injustices.46
information in a local developing country's markets will promote development
more efficiently than either direct foreign aid or technology transfers. History
teaches that uncompensated intellectual property transfers (piracy) as a devel-
opmental policy may have much to commend it because uncompensated trans-
fers may mark an attempt to return to the well-worn paths that led to past
successful economic development.").
45. See K.J. Greene, "Copynorms," Black Cultural Production, and the Debate
Over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179,
1180-81 (2008) ("The institutional music industry has resorted to copyright
infringement lawsuits to stem massive Internet piracy in recent years.... [T]he
'copynorms' rhetoric the entertainment industry espouses shows particular
irony in light of its long history of piracy of the works of African-American
artists, such as blues artists and composers. For many generations, black artists
as a class were denied the fruits of intellectual property protection-credit,
copyright royalties and fair compensation. Institutional discrimination teamed
with intellectual property and contract law resulted in the widespread under-
protection of black artistic creativity. Similarly, black inventors created techni-
cal and scientific works that impacted early American industries. Evidence
exists that black inventors also faced similar divestiture in the industrial mar-
ketplace. The mass appropriation of the work of black artists and inventors
reflects the systemic subordination based on race that characterized most of
U.S. history."). The full meaning of the adage "those who seek equity must do
equity" is beginning to resonate within the Western IP Imperialist's regimes.
See, e.g., Long, Traditional Knowledge and the Fight for the Public Domain,
supra note 7, 617, 628 (2006) ("[E]xplor[ing] the imperialism of the 19th cen-
tury and the imperialism that is being applied to traditional knowledge today[]
[t]he rhetoric of the two is frightening[ly] similar. We can avoid some of the
pitfalls of those earlier years if we consider diverse approaches. Access to
knowledge, human rights, intellectual property rights, etc. take the best of those
approaches and devise a regime that makes sense for all parties.").
46. See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, Symposium, A Social Justice Perspective on the
Role of Copyright in Realizing International Human Rights, 24 PAC. Mc-
GEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L J. 289, 289 (2012); Mtima, Fulfilling the
Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitizing Textual Information, supra note
33, at 101-06; Lateef Mtima, Symposium, Copyright Social Utility and Social
Justice Interdependence: A Paradigm for Intellectual Property Empowerment
and Digital Entrepreneurship, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 97, 141-47 (2009); Lateef
Mtima, Symposium, Introduction, 48 How. L.J. 571, 572 (2005) ("[Tlhe digital
revolution and similar technological advances present unheralded opportunities
through which to confront [intellectual property social inequity] from a socially
redeeming vantage point .... [T]he new technologies can provide the apparatus
through which to achieve a more equitable distribution of the benefits of crea-
tive endeavor."); Robert Sullivan, Indigenous Culture and Intellectual Property
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Just as the developing nations began to challenge American IP Imperial-
ism, the American public began to question the IP Commoditization Precept:
for the first time, private individuals gained the ability to interact with com-
mercially produced IP product in non-passive ways.47 With digital informa-
tion technology liberating many expressive works from static formats and
offering new methods for using and re-using existing works to produce new
works and even new forms of intellectual property, the American public be-
came unwilling to forego these creative and pedagogical boons solely on the
say-so of the IP Commoditization establishment.48 A national grassroots
movement to restore the public interest to the core of American IP policy
began to take hold, and a growing cross-section of IP stakeholders demanded
that the IP Commoditization Precept give way to the Constitution's intellec-
tual property mandates of cultural and innovative progress.49
Rights, 8 D-LIB MAG. no.5, 2002 (N.Z.), available at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/
may02/sullivan/05sullivan.html.
47. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Symposium, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital
Future, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63, 66 (2002); Lateef Mtima, The Changing
Landscape of Internet Use and Dissemination of Copyrighted Works: New
Tools, New Rules, or the Same Old Regime?, 24 THE COMPUTER & INTERNET
L., no. 10, 2007, at 4; Netanel, supra note 10, at 1, 3 ("P2P file sharing is not
just downloading music and movies for free. It is a vehicle for finding works
that are otherwise not available, discovering new genres, making personalized
compilations, and posting creative remixes, sequels, and modifications of popu-
lar works. By engaging in such activities, people who might previously have
been passive consumers now assert a more active, self-defining role in the en-
joyment, use, and creation of cultural expression.); Pamela Samuelson, Fair
Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form:
The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, I J. INTELL. . PROP. L. 49, 67-73
(1993).
48. See, e.g., Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyright-
able Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, supra
note 47, 102-03 ("[There is an] extraordinary array of electronic information
tools now available .. . that permit users to experiment with the plastic nature
of works in digital form. By plasticity, I mean the ease with which such works
can be manipulated, transformed, and/or inserted into other works. Although
many authors might prefer for their works to remain as fixed as they have
traditionally been in printed form, the genie of plasticity cannot be pushed back
into the bottle. Digital manipulation is here to stay, for the manipulability of
digital data is one of the key advantages of the digital medium.").
49. See, e.g., Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, supra note 47,
at 133-38; Mtima, Copyright Social Utility and Social Justice Interdepen-
dence: A Paradigm for Intellectual Property Empowerment and Digital Entre-
preneurship, supra note 46, at 119-36; Note, Spare the Mod: In Support of
Total-Conversion Modified Video Games, 125 HARV. L. REV. 789, 796 (2012)
("The social utility theory of intellectual property argues that lawmakers ought
to craft property rights to maximize net social welfare. Ideally, lawmakers will
grant enough exclusive rights to stimulate innovation but will not expand the
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Predictably, the American Digital Cultural Revolution has been met
with demands for even greater IP protections from the entrenched IP corpo-
rate community; predictably, but not consistently.50 Because digital informa-
tion technology not only provides new uses for traditional intellectual
property product, but has also engendered new kinds and forms of intellec-
tual property outside of IP conglomerate control, in the unwavering tradition
of American IP Imperialism many members of that community would prefer
that little or no "IP law and order" be extended to these new frontiers. Con-
sequently, it is not unusual to find some of the most ardent corporate support-
ers of stronger IP rights as the means for incorporating digital information
technology into the global IP framework actually arguing against strong IP
protection when it comes to regulating digital information IP interests cur-
rently outside their control.51
Some recent right-of-publicity disputes provide good examples of this
IP Imperialist ambidexterity. As a relatively new form of intellectual prop-
erty, the parameters and contours of these rights were still being charted as
digital information technology disrupted a plethora of timeworn IP pretexts
and assumptions.52 Consequently, much of the right of publicity law terrain,
both within and outside of the digital information context, is plainly unset-
tled, and like the robber barons of old, many IP Imperialists are eager to
preserve this "Oklahoma land-grab" state of affairs until they can stake their
claims to these new IP territories. However, as discussed in the next Part, the
right of publicity offers much more than new opportunities for IP Imperialist
expansion. Particularly in the digital information context, it can instead be
utilized to achieve important IP social utility and social justice goals. A brief
examination of the development of the right, and the application of IP social
justice tenets in its interpretation and application, elucidates its full social
utility/social justice potential.
PART III: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: A DIGITAL AGE
OPPORTUNITY FOR IP SOCIAL JUSTICE
A. The Origins of the Right of Publicity
In many ways, the right of publicity is something of the IP bastard child,
the unplanned progeny of the intersection of tort right of privacy with trade-
scope of such rights to an extent that would prevent society's enjoyment of
those innovations.").
50. See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong., (2011) (as intro-
duced in House, Oct. 26, 2011); PROTECT IP Act, S 968; Graeme McMillan,
Will 'PROTECT IP' Act Stop Piracy or Doom Online Innovation?, TIME, June
24, 2011, available at http://techland.time.com/201 1/06/24/will-protect-ip-act-
stop-piracy-or-doom-online-innovation/.
51. See, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir.
2006).
52. See infra Part II.
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mark, which is itself the "black sheep" of federal intellectual property law.53
The genesis of publicity rights can be traced to the landmark law review
article by two jurisprudential Young Turks, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, who defied convention and called for judicial recognition of "a
right to be let alone."54 Perturbed with the press's growing encroachment
upon private matters and the consequential public fascination with sensation-
alism, Warren and Brandeis' observations could well have been made in the
present day:
Of the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some such protection,
there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press is overstepping in every
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no
longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade,
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient
taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the
refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but mod-
ern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, sub-
jected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by
mere bodily injury.55
Although the right of privacy was not immediately welcomed by the
courts,5 6 gradually courts began to accept the principle that individuals were
entitled to some protection from intrusion upon their lives and personas, cul-
minating in a pivotal decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
wherein the right of publicity was recognized as a distinct species of the right
of privacy. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., the
53. Although trademark rights and interest have been recognized for centuries,
American courts and legislators had great difficulty finding a comfortable place
for trademark law in the federal IP regime. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37-38 (2003); See also Fowler, supra
note 33, at 1638-39. As to its influence upon the right of privacy, the latter
right is often said to manifest the propertization of tortuous protections and
interests. However, the kind of property interest involved is essentially that of a
right to control the marketing of one's persona, particularly as a source identi-
fier. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985);
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918); Canal
Co. v. Clark, 80 U. S. 311, 320 (1871).
54. See Warren, supra note 1, 193, 195.
55. Id. at 196.
56. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, I RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6.3 (2d ed.
2006); See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 451
(N.Y. 1902).
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plaintiff entered into an exclusive contract with a professional baseball player
to place his photograph on trading cards.57 The defendant, however, induced
the baseball player to allow it to also use his photograph on trading cards and
thereby breach his exclusive agreement. 58 The defendant argued that the
baseball player had no legally recognized property interest in his image that
he could have assigned to the plaintiff, and consequently the plaintiff had no
legal interest that the defendant could have invaded.59 The Court of Appeals
disagreed:
We think that in addition to and independent of [a] right of privacy ... a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant
the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture. . . . This right might be
called a 'right of publicity.' For it is common knowledge that many promi-
nent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feel-
ings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, bus-
ses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no
money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred
any other advertiser from using their pictures.60
Finally, in 1960 Dean Prosser published a seminal article charting the
various judicial conceptions of privacy rights in which he outlined four cate-
gories of judicially accepted privacy interests,61 describing the latter-most
interest as the right to protect one's image or likeness from misappropria-
tion.62 Thereafter, both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restate-
57. 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 867.
60. Id. at 868. See also Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203-04 (1954), available at http://scholarship.law.
duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2596&context=lcp ("Well known per-
sonalities... do not seek the 'solitude and privacy' which Brandeis and Warren
sought to protect .... However, although the well known personality does not
wish to hide his light under a bushel of privacy, neither does he wish to have
his name, photograph, and likeness reproduced and publicized without his con-
sent or without remuneration to him.").
61. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960), available at
http://www.califomialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/misc/prosser-privacy.pdf.
Dean Prosser enumerated the following four categories of invasion of privacy:
"[ilntrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private af-
fairs;" "[p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff;"
"[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;" and
"[aippropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or like-
ness." Id.
62. Id. This is the interest the Haelan court denominated as the right of publicity.
202 F.2d at 868.
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ment (Third) of Unfair Competition included the right of publicity,
enumerating the elements of the cause of action.63
B. Enforcing the Right of Publicity
In general, the right of publicity assures individuals the right to deter-
mine when or if others may utilize or exploit their images or personas, as
well as the right to participate in the commercial benefits that might be de-
rived from such uses:
The right of publicity is an intellectual property right of re-
cent origin which has been defined as the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.
[It] is a creature of state law and its violation gives rise to a cause
of action for the commercial tort of unfair competition.64
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
64. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc. 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 56, § 1:3); See
also Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957 (6th Cir.
1980) ("The famous have an exclusive legal right during life to control and
profit from the commercial use of their name and personality."). Particularly
insofar as celebrities are concerned, the right to control use and exploitation of
one's image or persona can also be asserted under the Lanham Act, through the
cause of false endorsement. False endorsement occurs where a person's image
or persona is used in association with a product in a way that is likely to mis-
lead the consuming public as to that person's sponsorship or approval of the
product:
A false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use of a celebrity's
identity is a type of false association claim, for it alleges the misuse of a
trademark, i.e., a symbol or device such as a visual likeness, vocal imita-
tion, or other uniquely distinguishing characteristic, which is likely to con-
fuse consumers as to the plaintiff's sponsorship or approval of the product.
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992). "When . . . a
celebrity brings a false endorsement suit under Section 43(a), his 'celebrity
persona' functions as the 'mark."' Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc. Case No. 2:09-cv-
01598-FMC-RZx, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 131387, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009);
See also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir.
1992). Likelihood of confusion is generally the controlling issue. See Wynn
Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988) (enumerating an eight
factor false endorsement likelihood of confusion test: (1) the level of recogni-
tion that the plaintiff has among the segment of the society for whom the defen-
dant's product is intended; (2) the relatedness of the fame or success of the
plaintiff to the defendant's product; (3) the similarity of the likeness used by
the defendant to the actual plaintiff; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) mar-
keting channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent
in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines (cit-
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Although the right of publicity is now widely recognized,65 identifying
its parameters continues to be difficult. This is partly due to varying regional
privacy customs and values, but the fact that publicity rights often seem to
conflict with some of society's most cherished and respected legal and social
mores also causes difficulty. The most obvious of these conflicts is with the
First Amendment. American society has a revered interest in promoting the
accurate discourse of historic and public events, including the roles of public
and private individuals in such events. If individuals were to possess an ab-
solute right to determine when their images or personas could be used or
referenced by others, they could effectively censor public discussion and
even historical accounts of actual events. 66
Consequently, the right of publicity is often said to end where the First
Amendment begins:
[T]he right of publicity cannot be used to prevent someone's
name or picture in news reporting. It cannot be used to prevent
the use of identity in an unauthorized biography. It cannot prevent
use of identity in an entertainment parody or satire, such as that of
Rich Little or Saturday Night Live.67
ing AMF, Inc., v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979)).
Because right of publicity and false endorsement claims are often raised simul-
taneously and substantively overlap, the disposition of the one is often difficult
to segregate from the resolution of the other. Nonetheless, the principal dis-
tinctions between false endorsement and right of publicity claims are (i) "trade-
mark status" for the plaintiff's persona, and (ii) the requirement of a likelihood
of confusion of the public as to the plaintiffs endorsement of the defendant's
product.
65. See MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, supra note 56, at § 6:3;
See also Gregory L. Curtner et al. Show and Tell: Misappropriation of the
Right of Publicity, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
2011, at 263, 271 (PLI Intell. Prop. Course Handbook Ser. No. 1040, 2011).
66. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Mason v. Jews for Jesus, No. 06
Civ. 6433 (RMB), 2006 WL 3230279 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006); Arrington v.
New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322-23 (N.Y. 1982); Nussenzweig v.
diCorcia, 832 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App. Div.), afftd, 878 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y.
2007).
67. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The
Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 130-31 (1995); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Base-
ball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[P]arody trading cards
receive full protection under the First Amendment. The cards provide social
commentary on public figures, major league baseball players, who are involved
in a significant commercial enterprise, major league baseball. While not core
political speech ... this type of commentary on an important social institution
constitutes protected expression."); See also Vinci v. Am. Can Co., 591 N.E.2d
793, 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (permitting unauthorized use of
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In addition to preserving public discourse and historical accuracy, First
Amendment concerns also tend to prioritize freedom of artistic expression
over publicity interests. For example in Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of both the right of publicity and the
false endorsement claims brought by film legend Ginger Rogers, as pre-
cluded by First Amendment interests.68 Rogers brought suit in connection
with the use of her name in the title of a film, Ginger and Fred.69 The gist of
Rogers's claims was that, even though the film was not about the famous
Rogers and Astaire dance team, the phrase "Ginger and Fred" invoked her
famous persona when used as the title of a film and therefore falsely traded
upon her persona to market a work to which she had no connection.70
In dismissing Rogers' claims, the court ruled that any invocation of her
persona in this instance was artistically relevant to the film because, while
the movie was not about Rogers or her former co-star, the title did have some
artistic, expressive relationship to the content of the film-a satiric social
commentary on the Hollywood Glamour Age-and was not merely a dis-
guised attempt by the defendant to trade upon Rogers's celebrity as a means
to promote his product.7' Consequently, the use was protected by the First
Amendment:
In light of the [state's] concern for the protection of free ex-
pression, [the court] would not expect [the state] to permit the
right of publicity to bar the use of a celebrity's name in a movie
title unless the title was "wholly unrelated" to the movie or was
"simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of
goods or services." Here ... the title "Ginger and Fred" is clearly
related to the content of the movie and is not a disguised adver-
tisement for the sale of goods or services or a collateral commer-
cial product.72
athletes' personas where "the mention of the athletes' names within the context
of accurate, historical information was incidental to the promotion of the ...
partnership ... [and] reference to the athletes and their accomplishments was
purely informational."). First Amendment interests similarly curtail false en-
dorsement claims under the Lanham Act. Thus, where a plaintiff raises a false
endorsement claim, the interposition of the First Amendment as a defense re-
quires that concerns regarding public confusion be counterbalanced against so-
ciety's interest in promoting free expression. See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 928,
936-37.
68. 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 996.
70. Id. at 1000-01.
71. Id. at 1005.
72. Id. at 1004-05. In addition to First Amendment issues, the use of a person in
literary expression can also implicate, and potentially conflict with, the copy-
right exclusive rights. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
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If it seems that, in a "battle of social utilities," the First Amendment will
always prevail over publicity rights, perhaps one reason for this impression is
that whereas the social function of freedom of speech is obvious, the social
utility underlying the right of publicity may seem comparatively obscure.
The First Amendment promotes democratic discourse and liberty, as well as
the unfettered expressive use of facts and ideas; in comparison, what lofty
social goals does the right of publicity promote? Indeed, some scholars have
found it difficult to find any social utility justification for the right of public-
ity.73 Thus, prescribing the right of the publicity can be challenging because
courts seem to delineate the right by negative implication, often construing
the right as only covering whatever is "left over" after the important social
utilities underlying the First Amendment and higher pecking order social mo-
res have been satisfied.
Unsurprisingly, this difficulty in definition leads to difficulty in enforce-
ment. Not only do varying regional values make it difficult to discern what
publicity interests will be recognized in a particular case, but even where the
right of publicity interests are relatively concrete, courts appear eager to sub-
jugate such interests in favor of competing social utilities, and consequently
the outcomes of right-of-publicity disputes can be extremely difficult to
predict.
The subjugation, and resulting obfuscation, of right-of-publicity inter-
ests, however, is not ineluctable. While at first blush the right of publicity
may not seem an especially socially relevant form of intellectual property,7 4
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31-33 (2003); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.,
636 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2011). The problem of copyright/right of public-
ity overlaps and conflicts is discussed in Part IV, infra.
73. See, e.g., K.J. Greene, The Right of Publicity: Is the Rent "Too Damn High"?,
in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 2011, at 279, 282
(PLI Intell. Prop. Ser. No. 1040, 2011); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1162 (2006); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Pop-
ular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 178-215 (1993). One
explanation for the less than charitable attitudes toward the right of publicity is
of course the overreaching and often baseless suits brought by some celebrities
Seeking to profit from even the most remote associations with their personas.
See, e.g., Lindsay Lohan & E-Trade Settle Milkaholic Baby Lawsuit, THE HUF-
FINGTON POST, Sept. 21, 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/09/21flindsay-lohan-etrade-sett n_733657.html. While the dissatisfac-
tion with such abuses is understandable, in the present era of copyright and
patent trolls, and the emerging issue of trademark bullying, the problem is by
no means restricted to the right of publicity. Just as these abuses do not give
rise to calls for the repeal of the copyright, patent, and trademark laws, how-
ever, right of publicity misuse is an insufficient basis upon which to do away
with publicity rights altogether.
74. See, e.g., Greene, The Right of Publicity: Is the Rent "Too Damn High"?,
supra note 73, at 282 ("[T]he right of publicity does not deliver the goods the
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upon closer analysis it becomes clear that the right of publicity can service
important social functions. To identify these functions, however, one must
adjust the analytical lens to account for a social justice perspective of the
intellectual property law.
C. The Social Utility and Social Justice Objectives of the Right of
Publicity
A social justice interpretation of intellectual property law begins with
the identification of social injustices and inequities relevant to a particular
area of intellectual property protection. For example, IP Imperialistic ex-
ploitation of the expressive output of a marginalized sub-community can be
assessed for its impact on copyright law's objective to "promote the progress
of the arts and sciences." Such exploitation at best nullifies the economic
incentive to create, and, at worst, affirmatively discourages such acts as fixa-
tion and dissemination by members of exploited groups who have cause to
view such activities as rendering their works more vulnerable to misappropri-
ation.T5 Such instances illustrate intellectual property social utility/social jus-
tice interdependence,76 a concept that has been explored in various important
intellectual property contexts. 77 The social justice implications appurtenant
way copyright and patent regimes do-copyright gives us movies, books, mu-
sic, and patent gives us everything from BMW engine components to little blue
pills for men of a certain age. Even trademark law's harshest detractors con-
cede the efficacy of trademark law's prevention of consumer confusion in the
marketplace of goods. In contrast . . .publicity rights seem to do little more
than to enrich already rich artists and athletes, and to provide a lucrative plat-
form for reality television stars such as Snooki and Paris Hilton.").
75. See, e.g., Mtima, Copyright Social Utility and Social Justice Interdependence:
A Paradigm for Intellectual Property Empowerment and Digital Entrepreneur-
ship, supra note 46, at 126-27 ("The social engineering aspirations which un-
derlie American copyright law were of sufficient importance to the Framers
that they provided for their satisfaction in the very first Article of the Constitu-
tion. Included among those goals is a system for author incentives, intended to
help fuel artistic output .... When the author incentive function is so widely
corrupted that authors from significant segments of the population are system-
atically deprived of their copyright property rights and incentives, it is not only
a problem of copyright social injustice, it also constitutes an assault upon the
function of copyright social utility. Creative authors who do not benefit from
the copyright regime have little incentive to participate in it. When marginal-
ized groups and communities have no expectation of reward from copyright
protection, their members lose the institutional incentive to produce artistic
works.").
76. Id.
77. Indeed, the advent of digital information technology has sparked a general
refocus of scholarly, policy, and professional attention toward social utility and
social justice obligations of the intellectual property law as a whole. See, e.g.,
Rita Heimes, Trademarks, Identity, and Justice, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
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to mass-digitization of copyrighted text and Internet file sharing have been
explored by copyright scholars and in major copyright controversies.78 Simi-
lar issues have been analyzed in the context of global health crises and
pandemics, and other problems relevant to the development of patentable
inventions,79 and enforcement of patents and trademarks in connection with
pharmaceutical drugs.S0
PROP. L. 133, 148 (2011) ("One measure of development and distributive jus-
tice, then, is in the mechanisms by which opportunities and access to capabili-
ties are made available to all, means by which inequalities 'in the distribution
of substantive freedoms and capabilities' are reduced. These freedoms and ca-
pabilities could well include property interests in intangibles such as intellec-
tual property. Access to them could certainly assist with improved self-help,
self-reliance, and self-confidence, the deprivation of which is a form of pov-
erty." (quoting AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 119 (Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 1999))); Long, "Democratizing Globalization: Practicing the Poli-
cies of Cultural Inclusion, supra note 33, at 252 ("[Jlust as human rights and
the protection of culture have been raised to an area of international social
justice, so too, the protection of the expressions of humankind's cultural crea-
tivity (intellectual property) is worthy of being protected as a matter of social
justice, with all the requirements of access and fairness that such social justice
requires.").
78. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679 n. 15
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing the social justice impact of the proposed Google
Books settlement, stating that "supporters of the proposed settlement argue that
it would 'serve[ ] copyright law's central purpose of advancing knowledge and
culture by furthering copyright's social utility and social justice goals through
inclusion of those who have been excluded. The Google Books Project fur-
thers these goals by using an accepted copyright mechanism (i.e., a private,
court-supervised settlement) to address the novel copyright problems presented
by the new technologies, while still preserving the rights of copyright hold-
ers."' (quoting Mtima, Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitiz-
ing Textual Information, supra note 33, at 79-80); See also James
Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, 58 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 497, 506-10 (2011) (discussing the terms of the Authors Guild
settlement); Pamela Samuelson, Symposium, Google Book Search and the Fu-
ture Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1308, 1319-51 (2010) (discussing
potential effects of Authors Guild settlement on various aspects of society and
economy).
79. See, e.g., MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 175-78 (2012); Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 583 F.3d 832, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
affd, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
80. See, e.g., PETER MAYBARDUK, PROGRAM ON INFORMATION JUSTICE AND INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY, ACTA AND PUBLIC HEALTH, available at http://digital
commons.wcl.ameican.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi ?article= 101 l&context=re-
search; Simone A. Rose, Symposium, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other
Market Failures: A Case for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Pat-
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As is the case with other intellectual property rights, the right of public-
ity can be and has been invoked in the cause of concrete social utility objec-
tives. Even the right's harshest critics would acknowledge that the right has
been invoked for the socially cognizant purpose of protecting individual pri-
vacy and personal dignity.81 In this regard, practitioners and the courts have
yet to mine the full social potential of the right of publicity. For example, the
problem of negative racial, ethnic, and gender stereotypes implemented
through the unauthorized use of individual images or personas could be
brought within the ambit of the right. Uses that result in depictions or repre-
sentations that are not negative per se, but may be culturally offensive or
sacrilegious, might also be analytically accessible through right of publicity
doctrine.
It is possible to redress, or at least curtail, these and similar social ineq-
uities through the right of publicity. The social utility objectives that under-
gird the right of publicity can be interpreted to encompass pertinent remedial
social justice goals, such as eradicating negative stereotypes and depictions,
and culturally offensive representations, at least where individually recogniz-
able personas are involved. Thus, the right to control the use and exploita-
tion of one's persona can be an instrument wielded to achieve a social as well
as individual monetary benefit. In such cases, an analytical interdependence
between right-of-publicity social utility and remedial social justice is identi-
fied, and the law can be responsively utilized and shaped to advance socially
propitious goals.82 In this way, socially progressive and equitable policies
ent Property, 48 How. L.J. 579, 582 (2005). For an analysis of the social jus-
tice opportunities and obligations arising in connection with trademark rights
See Heimes, supra note 77, at 148, 149, 152 ("[T]he best arguments to support
a social justice foundation in trademark and identity law rest on notions of
preventing unfair competition and unjust enrichment. These policy goals for
recognizing enforceable publicity rights in persona or identity protect the indi-
vidual as effectively as the corporation. Few scholars have applied this analy-
sis to trademark law, although as a feature of commercial activity trademarks
are naturally connected to entrepreneurship and, logically, to personal empow-
erment. Because trademarks and publicity rights can serve as strong personal
property interests, it bears considering, in examination of social and distributive
justice principles, whether there is a justice-based argument to be made for
helping individuals acquire and protect trademarks and publicity rights.").
81. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 443 (6th Cir. 2003), wherein the
civil rights icon brought an action Seeking to prevent the use of her name in a
rap record using profanity and offensive language. Indeed, this was one of
Warren and Brandeis's specific objectives in arguing for recognition of that
right. See Warren, supra note 1, at 196.
82. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Carpenter, Internet Publication: The Case for an Ex-
panded Right of Publicity for Non-Celebrities, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 11, 14
(2001) ("Scholars and courts have isolated four primary policy justifications for
the right of publicity: providing incentives for creativity, allowing those who
achieve notoriety to enjoy the fruits of their own labor, guarding against con-
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can be pursued and achieved through strategic invocation and application of
right-of-publicity law and doctrine.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has articulated an extremely
important and time-honored social utility/justice function in connection with
the right of publicity.83 As the Court has observed, the right of publicity
provides an incentive to individuals to invest effort and resources in the de-
velopment and stylization of personal attributes and innovations, and to pur-
sue activities and accomplishments of public and popular interest, with the
possibility of celebrity, public renown, and attendant commercial reward.84
Moreover, the Court observed that social objectives of the right of pub-
licity are as important as those promoted by patent and copyright laws, and
are not always outweighed by those underlying the First Amendment.85 This
sumer deception, and preventing unjust enrichment.... The fourth . . . ratio-
nale ... for recognizing the right of publicity is that it prevents publishers from
unfairly profiting from a celebrity's public reputation without sharing some of
that profit with the celebrity who worked for that reputation. This moral argu-
ment reflects a basic societal belief that it is wrong for 'free-riders' or 'para-
sites' to appropriate (and profit from) another person's hard work."); Heimes,
supra note 77, at 157 ("The philosophical reasons for promoting individual
ownership of identity complement the economic ones, at least from a social
justice perspective. One is morally entitled to self-define and even to commer-
cialize one's own persona. At the same time, the opportunity to exploit identity
for commercial gain ... by taking advantage of accidental fame-is one addi-
tional opportunity for empowerment through entrepreneurship .... In the social
justice context, supporting these individual interests and values is warranted
provided the broader societal interests in cultural development and freedom of
expression are taken into consideration."); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right
of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis,
70 IND. L.J. 47, 55-56 (1994) ("[T]he right of publicity has the potential for
safeguarding from unauthorized use any marketable and publicly recognizable
attribute of any individual, regardless of whether that person is a celebrity.
Moreover, whatever the means through which an individual's persona comes to
have value, that value should be attributable to the persona of the publicity
plaintiff who has a right to participate in decisions about how her persona is
utilized by others. This is the overall objective which the right of publicity
tries to fulfill."); Spare the Mod: In Support of Total- Conversion Modified
Video Games, supra note 49, at 801 ("The personality theory of intellectual
property protection posits that the artist defines herself through art. The crea-
tion of artistic works binds the artist to her products. Accordingly, the artist
ought to have moral rights over the use of her works.").
83. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
84. Id. ("[T]he State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting
the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such
entertainment. . . .[T]he State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of
patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the
reward of his endeavors.").
85. Id. at 576.
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is especially true where an individual's publicity interest would be com-
pletely eviscerated by a purported First Amendment use:
Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media
reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. The Constitution no
more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for
broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege respondent to film
and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright
owner.
86
When considered in the context of IP social utility, the social justice
function of publicity rights becomes even more significant. Consistent with
the Supreme Court's observations, subsequent courts have recognized that in
instances of a conflict between the First Amendment rights and the right of
publicity, free speech interests are not the only social utilities to be protected:
[H]aving recognized the high degree of First Amendment protection for
noncommercial speech about celebrities, we need not conclude that all ex-
pression that trenches on the right of publicity receives such protection. The
right of publicity, like copyright, protects a form of intellectual property that
society deems to have some social utility. "Often considerable money, time
and energy are needed to develop one's prominence in a particular field.
Years of labor may be required before one's skill, reputation, notoriety or
virtues are sufficiently developed to permit an economic return through some
medium of commercial promotion. For some, the investment may eventually
create considerable commercial value in one's identity."
[A state's] decision to protect [a performer's] right of publicity ... rests
on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort
invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him
to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to
the public. This same consideration underlies the patent and copyright
laws long enforced by this Court.
Id.; See also Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on
Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1330 (2002) ("[C]elebrities 'create' their valuable per-
sonas in much the same way that a novelist creates a work of fiction or an
inventor a new device. Thus, giving the famous individual a property right in
this form of intellectual property has been explained as an incentive to promote
future creativity, as a reward for a valuable service to the public, or as a means
of preventing unjust enrichment."); Kwall, supra note 82, at 74 ("As a society,
we can suffer two general types of harms from the toleration of unauthorized
uses of an individual's persona. One type of harm focuses on the increased
potential for consumer deception, and the other focuses on the increased poten-
tial for diminished incentives.").
86. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574-74 (emphasis added).
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The present case exemplifies this kind of creative labor. Moe and Je-
rome (Curly) Howard and Larry Fein fashioned personae collectively known
as The Three Stooges, first in vaudeville and later in movie shorts, over a
period extending from the 1920's to the 1940's. The three comic characters
they created and whose names they shared-Larry, Moe, and Curly-pos-
sess a kind of mythic status in our culture. Their journey from ordinary
vaudeville performers to the heights (or depths) of slapstick comic celebrity
was long and arduous. Their brand of physical humor-the nimble, comi-
cally stylized violence, the "nyuk-nyuks" and "whoop-whoop-whoops," eye-
pokes, slaps and head conks-created a distinct comedic trademark.
Through their talent and labor, they joined the relatively small group of ac-
tors who constructed identifiable, recurrent comic personalities that they
brought to the many parts they were scripted to play.87
Resourceful ingenuity and creativity exercised under challenging socio-
economic conditions often spur the development, refinement, and stylization
of personal attributes and individual innovations, which can in turn engender
enormous popular culture interest and concomitant commercial potential.88
However, institutionalized barriers to information, financial capital, and legal
support often preclude marginalized innovators from taking a full advantage
of commercial exploitation while facilitating exploitation by majority enter-
prises and concerns.89 The misappropriation or other inequitable exploitation
of the publicity rights of members of marginalized groups, which have fewer
entrepreneurial/access to wealth opportunities90 presents an especially invit-
ing opportunity for a social justice oriented application of the right of public-
ity, since such unfair exploitation undermines the enunciated social utility/
87. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804-05 (Cal.
2001). As discussed in Part IV, infra, the Comedy III court promulgated its own
test for balancing right of publicity and First Amendment interests, the "trans-
formative test". Id. at 808. Under the transformative test, a court examines the
extent of the user's expressive transformation of the plaintiffs image or per-
sona, to determine whether the user is trading upon the plaintiff's recognizable
image or has transformed that image into a new expressive work. Id. Also in
Part IV, the Rogers and Comedy III tests measure different social utilities, and
selecting the appropriate test is critical to a proper balancing of right of public-
ity and First Amendment interests.
88. See Heimes, supra note 77, at 151.
89. Id. at 148-49.
90. See Lateef Mtima, Symposium, African-American Economic Empowerment
Strategies for the New Millennium - Revisiting the Washington-Du Bois Dia-
lectic, 42 How. L.J. 391, 428-29 (1999); W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest
for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical, and Related Considerations, 48 How.
L.J. 1, 59 (2004).
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justice goals of the right of publicity as well as ecumenical principles of
justice.9 1
To properly assess and balance right-of-publicity interests against other
important societal goals, and thereby delineate socially productive parame-
ters for publicity rights, it is necessary to identify important social utility
functions underlying the right of publicity. Invocation of the overarching
social utility goals of intellectual property law is a cogent mechanism for
resolving IP disputes in the digital information age and balancing constituent
interests and competing social objectives.92 Moreover, when courts evaluate
intellectual property disputes within the context of social productivity and
efficacy, their reasoning typically illuminates a functional interdependence
between IP social utility and IP social justice: socially propitious mecha-
91. See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Right of Publicity, Identify,and Performance, 28 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 865 (2011). The social utility goals that
underlie the Lanham Act, including protection against unfair competition and
consumer confusion, also resonate with the above-enumerated right of publicity
social justice objectives. See Heimes, supra note 77, at 149. Not only should
marginalized individuals derive the commercial benefits form the "persona
properties" they develop, but the consuming public should not be misled into
supporting products and business unaffiliated with individuals whom they ad-
mire and revere. Thus, right-of-publicity social justice can also be pursued and
enforced through the companion federal false endorsement cause of action.
92. See, e.g., Id. at 144 ("The relevance of protecting identity from misuse is
heightened exponentially by technological advancements in digital communi-
cation. Images can be copied from one location, edited, and reposted to an-
other in myriad new ways-some flattering but many not-by anonymous
Internet users generally beyond the reach of the law."). Of course, advances in
digital information technology also offer new and socially beneficial opportuni-
ties for the development, dissemination, and exploitation of information and
ideas, innovative advances, and individual creative expression. The parameters
of intellectual property protection must be continuously reassessed to ensure
that they complement the immediate and potential boons of such advances, so
that technological options and opportunities for social good are not impeded by
legal sub-structures incompatible with unanticipated kinds and uses of intellec-
tual property. See generally Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and
Protect User-Generated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context,
supra note 41, at 848-49 (advocating to modify the Copyright Act and codify
current practice in the social media. Among other things, the author proposes to
allow "noncommercial social network users to post links to and portions of
copyrighted work without permission" and a "broad right to create and dissem-
inate derivative works online for noncommercial purposes."); Lateef Mtima,
Tasini and its Progeny: The New Exclusive Right or Fair Use on the Electronic
Publishing Frontier? 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 369,
409-13 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 687-88 (2012) (discussing "un-
governability of images in copyright law" and advocating adopting the true
"reproduction right" against the standard of exact or near-exact copying).
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nisms also tend to be socially just ones (and vice versa). Accordingly, the
proper adjudication of right-of-publicity claims can achieve a beneficial so-
cial utility/social justice balance-one that is disrupted where the assessment
is "IP social justice insensitive" or outright IP Imperialist in perspective.93
Some courts have found it difficult to achieve proper social utility bal-
ance in publicity disputes because they fail to accord proper weight to the
social justice attributes of the right of publicity or to otherwise assess the full
range of social utility interests at issue.94 The failure to appreciate these so-
cial justice objectives and concerns has caused some courts to needlessly and
unfairly restrict right-of-publicity interests and sometimes inadvertently ser-
vice IP Imperialistic agendas. 95
93. IP Imperialist stratagems thus have the same deleterious effect in both the in-
digenous culture and marginalized communities contexts. See, e.g., Drahos,
supra note 35, at 5 ("Does it matter if the capacity of [developing countries] to
influence the [IP] standard-setting process remains weak? ... Since intellectual
property rights are but one micro-tool of national policy it is difficult to isolate
their importance as a variable in development. If, as the World Bank has sug-
gested, development is about expanding the ability of people "to shape their
own futures" then we have a prima facie normative reason to be concerned
about the loss of national sovereignty of developing countries over standards
that impact on sectors such as agriculture, food, environment, health and educa-
tion."); Recht, supra note 37, at 284, ("Protection of intellectual property in
indigenous societies implicates issues of human rights, cultural survival, and
physical subsistence of those societies. 'Primarily . . . when we talk about
protecting traditional knowledge we are talking about protecting the livelihoods
of the poor.' In 1993, the UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities and its Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions produced 'The Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual
Property of Indigenous Peoples,' which placed protection of indigenous knowl-
edge into the context of human rights." (quoting Coombe, supra note 36, at
278)); See also Coombe, supra note 36, at 277-78 (discussing " international
law-making efforts with respect to indigenous and traditional environmental
knowledge").
94. Doe v. TCI Cablevision of Mo., No. ED 78785, 2002 WL 1610972, at *12
(E.D. Mo. 2002).
95. For example some courts have observed that certain social utility objectives
that underlie the right of publicity are less important where celebrity interests
and incentives are involved. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Base-
ball Players Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996).
"[E]ven without the right of publicity the rate of return of stardom in the
entertainment and sports fields is probably high enough to bring forth a
more than 'adequate' supply of creative effort and achievement." . . .
[C]elebrities would still be able to reap financial reward from authorized
appearances and endorsements. The extra income generated by licensing
one's identity does not provide a necessary inducement to enter and
achieve in the realm of sports and entertainment. Thus, while publicity
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The next Part discusses four cases involving analyses relevant to creat-
ing a more socially cognizant application of publicity laws. In the first three
cases, courts' uninformed perceptions of the social utility objectives of the
right of publicity led to unduly narrow, and in some instances patently unjust,
applications of the law. In the final case, however, the court's analysis dem-
onstrates how these issues can be assessed in a more socially efficacious
manner.
PART IV: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND JUDICIAL "SOCIAL
JUSTICE MYOPIA"
As discussed in Part III, a significant challenge to proper enforcement of
publicity rights is a persistent misperception that certain, hallowed social
objectives, such as those promoting free and open discourse, in disputes over
the unauthorized exploitation of publicity rights. While these social interests
are obviously important, there can also be competing and equally important
publicity-based social utility and social justice interests at stake. Society's
interest in promoting notable achievements, social equity, and economic em-
powerment (particularly in connection with marginalized members of soci-
ety) through innovative undertakings and/or the development and
exploitation of individualized styles and personas can be just as important as
society's interest in unbridled expression. Consequently, to preserve social
utility objectives of the right of publicity, it is essential that right-of-publicity
practitioners and commentators assist the courts in identifying the full range
of social utility and social justice interests involved in right of publicity
cases.
The four cases discussed in this Part explore the issue of heightening
judicial awareness of social utility/social justice functions of the right of pub-
licity. The first case explores the issue of judicial insensitivity to the right of
publicity social utility and social justice as a threshold matter.96 Where a
court all but fails to acknowledge the important social function of publicity
rights, virtually any competing social interest will appear to outweigh the
publicity right holder's interests and can lead to inequitable and unjust re-
sults. The remaining cases analyze the problem of balancing the acknowl-
rights may provide some incentive for creativity and achievement, the
magnitude and importance of that incentive has been exaggerated.
Id. at 974 (quoting Madow, supra note 73, at 210). While this is true is some
cases, it overlooks the realities faced by some members of marginalized com-
munities. It is the prospect of attendant compensation that motivates an inner
city youth to pursue a career as a professional athlete in the face of overwhelm-
ing statistics that she will likely not have a professional career. And even is she
never makes it to the "majors" endorsement opportunities and other exploita-
tion of personal celebrity can provide a path out of poverty, especially for those
who also face institutionalized racial impediments.
96. See Brooks v. Topps Co., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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edged social utilities of the right of publicity against other social interests.97
In these cases, the issue is according proper weight to the social function of
the right of publicity, so as to ensure an achievement of appropriate balance
of all the pertinent social interests and objectives.
A. Identifying Opportunities for the Right of Publicity Social Justice:
Brooks v. Topps Co.98
The dispute in Brooks v. Topps Co. presented a prime opportunity for a
social justice application of the right of publicity.99 However, the decision is
a paradigm of judicial insensitivity to the social utility function of the right of
publicity. In Brooks, Connie Brooks, the daughter of deceased African-
American Baseball Hall of Famer James Bell, brought right of publicity and
false endorsement claims in connection with the unauthorized use of her fa-
ther's image on baseball trading cards.100 Before his death, Bell had actively
exploited his celebrity persona:
Bell granted the National Baseball Hall of Fame permission to use
his name and likeness on various products. In 1989, he contracted
with Gartlan USA, Inc., to autograph cards that the company
would sell along with figurines in his likeness. Following Bell's
death, [the plaintiff] granted commercial licenses to use Bell's
name and images of him. In or around 1994 and 2001, Brooks
licensed Bell's name to the Upper Deck Company ... for use on
baseball cards. . . . From approximately September 17, 1993
through June 1, 1994, she licensed Bell's name and a particular
image of him to Rodrigues Studio for use on clothing and prints.
She also entered into a licensing agreement with General Mills to
permit it to print Bell's name and likeness on Wheaties Boxes sold
around February 1996. Around mid-1996, she licensed Bell's
"name and likeness" to a company called Crown Crafts, for use on
throw blankets.01
Subsequent to Bell's death, Brooks discovered that The Topps Trading
Company ("Topps"), a well-known purveyor of sports trading cards and
memorabilia, had engaged in various unauthorized uses of her father's im-
age, whereupon she undertook extensive efforts to determine the full scope
of Topps' unauthorized activities:
97. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008); Laws v. Sony
Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
Case No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2009).
98. 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1361.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1364.
101. Id. at 1363.
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Topps's first contact with Brooks occurred in late 2004. Brian Koeberle
("Koeberle"), acting on behalf of Topps, contacted Brooks by telephone to
ask if she would license her father's name and likeness for baseball cards to
be published in 2005. At this time Brooks did not know, and Koeberle did
not mention, that Topps had previously published seven cards depicting Bell.
After several telephone conversations, Koeberle sent Brooks an unsolicited
proposed license agreement. Under this draft, dated December 17, 2004,
Topps would have paid Brooks $ 5,000 for the non-exclusive right to use
Bell's name and image on its trading cards for the year 2005. Koeberle
stated in the cover letter that Brooks had agreed in the telephone call to this
offer, but she had not done so. Brooks rejected this agreement.
In early 2005, a friend told Brooks that Topps might have sold a Bell
card. Brooks asked Topps about this. On February 15, 2005, she received a
letter from Philip J. Carter ("Carter"), Director of Sports/Player Licensing at
Topps, enclosing the 2004 eTopps card and one of the 2004 Tribute Hall of
Fame cards and saying that Carter was still looking for other cards Topps
may have published depicting Bell. Brooks called Carter and told him she
wanted Topps to stop engaging in any conduct relating to Bell, requested
compensation for the two cards Topps had printed in 2004, and asked if
Topps had printed any other Bell cards.
In mid-2005, a friend of Brooks showed her one of the 2001 Topps Bell
cards. Brooks immediately contacted Carter, who asked questions about the
card and said he knew nothing about it but would look into it. In response to
further inquiries from Brooks, Carter said he was unable to find any informa-
tion about the 2001 card or any other Bell card.
On June 26, 2005, Topps offered Brooks $ 35,000 to sign a settlement
agreement and release of liability ("Settlement Agreement"). She refused
and asked again for an accounting of all of the Bell cards Topps had
published.
On December 27, 2005, Brooks wrote a letter to Carter demanding a
retraction of the erroneous Nickname Statement, a luncheon in her father's
honor, and full information about all of the Bell cards Topps had published.
Carter responded by offering to publish a correction of the Nickname State-
ment and to discuss publishing another Bell card on condition that Brooks
sign the Settlement Agreement.
By letter dated January 31, 2006, Adam Zucker, Carter's successor, pro-
vided Brooks with a list of "all cards of Cool Papa Bell produced by Topps
from 2001-2005." 02
102. Id. at 1364 (emphasis added). In addition to producing the trading cards, Topps
also affirmatively marketed that Bell endorsed the use of his name and image:
Topps issued promotional materials for both the 2001 and 2004 cards. The
2004 promotional materials contained two statements that Brooks notes in
her opposition papers. One footnote in those materials stated in miniscule
print that "[a]lthough these players have agreed to provide these cards for
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Although there was no dispute as to Topps' unauthorized conduct,
Topps moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limi-
tations had run.10 3 The motion was granted by the court:
The relevant New York cause of action, an action for right of
publicity claims . . . has a one-year statute of limitations ...
Under the single publication rule, this limitations period runs from
the date of an offending item's publication, and "the dissemination
of that same offending item thereafter does not give rise to a new
cause of action, nor does it refresh the running of the statute of
limitations."
The first publication of the most recent baseball card at issue... occurred
on November 1, 2004. Brooks filed her lawsuit more than one year later, on
March 27, 2006.104
The court was unmoved by Brooks' arguments that the limitations pe-
riod should be tolled in light of Topps' evasive actions:
[Brooks] argues that the discovery rule, under which the statute of
limitations would run from the date on which she discovered or
reasonably could have discovered the defendant's actions, should
apply here. Brooks does not contend that New York courts have
ever found that a right of publicity claim accrues upon discovery,
but argues that it should be adopted here in order to avoid depriv-
ing her of "a reasonable chance to assert a valid claim."
Brooks' request for such an extension is rejected. Under New
York law, statutes of limitations "cannot be deemed arbitrary or
unreasonable solely on the basis of a harsh effect."
Brooks next argues that Topps should be estopped from asserting
a statute of limitations defense because it concealed the existence
of certain cards from her.
December 7, 2005 was at least arguably within the limitations pe-
riod for the non-disclosed 2004 cards. There is no evidence, how-
ever, that Topps made affirmative misrepresentations to Brooks
within one year of the date the cards were published.105
Topps, we cannot guarantee that all autographs . . . will be received in
time for inclusion in this product.
Id.
103. Id. at 1362.
104. Brooks, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 1365, 1366 (citations omitted). The court also went out of its way to
dismiss plaintiff's federal claims:
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The court's latter finding seems not only cursory, but also social utility/
justice blind. A reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that Topps had
indeed engaged in a well-timed subterfuge, which conveniently came to a
halt (and with a comprehensive listing of all unauthorized uses of Bell's im-
age) just weeks after the limitations period ran. In addition, Bell's daughter
had commenced the litigation as a pro se litigant. These facts would seem to
indicate that a weighing of the relevant equities strongly supported the tolling
of the statute.106
Unfortunately, the court seemed concerned only with the social utilities
underlying the limitation rules, which is particularly unsatisfying because
few, if any, of these utilities were actually implicated in the litigation. For
example, the operative facts covered a relatively short and recent time period,
and thus the typical concerns over stale evidence, faulty memories, or un-
available witnesses were not an issue. 107 Moreover, not only does the court's
Personal names and photographs are not inherently distinctive, and there-
fore are "protected only if, thorough usage, they have acquired distinctive-
ness and secondary meaning."
"'Secondary meaning' is a term of art referencing a trademark's ability to
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself." . . . Fac-
tors that may be considered in determining whether a mark has developed
secondary meaning include "(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer
studies linking the mark to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage of the
product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6)
length and exclusivity of the mark's use."
Brooks has presented no evidence relating to four of these six factors.
With respect to the fourth and sixth factors, she has described several
commercial licensing arrangements, has offered documentary evidence
corroborating the existence of one of them, but has provided no evidence
of any sales made to the public by the licenses. While Brooks licensed
Bell's name commercially on scattered occasions in 1993, 1994, 1996, and
2003, Brooks licensed the image of Bell at issue here on a single occasion.
Given this record, no reasonable juror could find that "the public is moved
in any degree to buy an article" displaying Bell's name or image based on
the belief that it implies endorsement by his estate, Brooks, or by any
unknown source.
Id. at 1367-68 (citations omitted). Id. it implies endorsement by his estate,
Brooks, or by any unknown source.
106. For an in-depth discussion of the court's disposition of Topps' limitations de-
fense and an alternative analysis of the issue, see Ritu Narula, "Wait, I Didn't
Even Know My Picture Was Taken!": Application of the Discovery Rule to a
Right of Publicity Claim, 53 How. L.J. 859, 860-61 (2010).
107. Id. at 879-81; see also Christoff v. Nestl6 USA, Inc., 62 CAL. RP-rR. 3d 122,
144 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 47 Cal. 4th 468 (2011)
(wherein, in addressing the application of the statute of limitations, the court
directed that on remand the trial court should instruct the jury to determine
"whether a reasonable person in [the plaintiffs] position had a meaningful abil-
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decision fail to promote statute of limitations' objectives, it undermines the
policies underlying the right of publicity, as well as general notions of social
justice, and further promotes IP imperialist overreaching. Defendant Topps
is a major purveyor of IP products that aggressively protects its own IP
rightsl08 but apparently has no qualms about engaging in the brazenly illegal
use of an African American baseball legend's image and persona. The result
here is a paradigmatic reinforcement of the "what's mine is mine but what's
your is ours" robber baron view of IP rights.
One explanation for the court's narrow approach may be insensitivity to
the social utilities underlying Bell's publicity rights, of which the court
seems to take no notice. There was little societal benefit in allowing the
pirated use of Bell's image. However, there were important social utilities to
be served in protecting the rights of a socially marginalized African-Ameri-
can sports figure, who achieved a successful baseball career and developed a
celebrity persona despite being denied many social and legal rights and ad-
vantages. 09 As the Supreme Court observed in Zacchini, providing encour-
agement for this kind of social productivity is one of the central purposes
underlying publicity rights."10
The Brooks decision demonstrates the need for threshold sensitivity to
the social utility/justice bases of the right of publicity. In this case, where the
countervailing social utilities were virtually non-existent, recognition of these
important functions of publicity rights would almost certainly have resulted
in the opposite outcome.
B. Balancing First Amendment and Right of Publicity Social Utility:
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc. I"'
Even when courts acknowledge the social utility of the right of public-
ity, they often fail to afford it an appropriate weight, when measured against
competing social objectives. Arguably, the most challenging balancing
problems are those involving First Amendment rights. Despite the Supreme
ity to discover the [unauthorized] use of his likeness."). A possible reason for
the reluctance of the Brooks court to consider the tolling issue may be the lack
of a framework through which to determine when publicity limitations periods
should (or should not) be tolled. A proposal for such a framework is offered in
Part V, infra.
108. Indeed, the irony that the leading right of publicity case was brought by a trad-
ing card company seems to have escaped the court. See Haelan Labs., Inc., v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.3d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
109. William C. Rhoden, Sports of the Times: Cool Papa's Stolen Moments, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1990, available at http://www.nytimes.coml1990/08/O7/sports/
sports-of-the-times-cool-papa-s-stolen-moments.html.
110. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
111. Case No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 131387 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 2009).
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Court's admonitions in Zacchini, many courts demonstrate almost Pavlovian
deference to free speech claims, when confronted with a First Amendment
defense to a claim of misappropriation of publicity rights.11 2
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., provides a recent example."13 In Brown,
NFL Hall of Famer Jim Brown brought a suit claiming both Lanham Act
false endorsement and state law invasion of privacy (publicity) in connection
with the use of his likeness in the Madden NFL video game series."14
"Brown allege[d] that [the defendant] misappropriated his name, identity,
and likeness by including him in the games as a player on two 'historic'
teams.""15 Although the company did not use Brown's name and jersey num-
ber in the games, Brown argued that the defendant had merely made superfi-
cial changes to the subject avatar to avoid liability:
In the games, virtual players on current NFL teams wear the names and
numbers of real-life players, whereas players on historical teams are anony-
mous, represented by numbers and roster positions....
. . . The character who purportedly represents Brown in the game is
anonymous, and wears jersey number 37; Brown wore number 32.
Brown and his doppelgainger have "nearly identical" statistics. 116
In its defense, the defendant argued, inter alia, that its unauthorized use
constituted a literary expression protected by the First Amendment.' 7 In
resolving the dispute, the court predicated its analysis on Rogers v. Gri-
112. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 944, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). It
has been observed that First Amendment concerns play a special role in the
judicial curbing of publicity rights:
Because the right of publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood of
confusion requirement, it is potentially more expansive than the Lanham
Act. Perhaps for that reason, courts delineating the right of publicity,
more frequently than in applying the Lanham Act, have recognized the
need to limit the right to accommodate First Amendment concerns.
In particular, three courts, citing their concern for free expression, have
refused to extend the right of publicity to bar the use of a celebrity's name
in the title and text of a fictional or semi-fictional book or movie....
Commentators have also advocated limits on the right of publicity to ac-
commodate First Amendment concerns.
Id. at 1004 & n. I1 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also James M.
Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histo-
ries, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 637, 671-72 (1973).
113. See 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387.
114. Id. at *2, *4.
115. Id. at *4.
116. Id. at *3-4.
117. Id. at *7.
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maldi. 118 The court began by noting that the defendant's use was a "literary
expression" under the First Amendment.' 19 "It is well established that 'video
games are a form of expression protected by the First Amendment.' "'120 Hav-
ing found the use to be an expressive one, the court then applied the Rogers
"relevance of the use to the work" standard, noting that, in its view, the level
of relevance of the persona to the subject work need merely be "above zero"
to sustain the unauthorized use. 21 Finally, the court observed that, in a game
involving manipulation of virtual athletes and franchises, "[u]se of a legen-
dary NFL player's likeness in a game about NFL football is clearly rele-
vant."122 Consequently, having found the use of Brown's persona relevant to
the video game (and not merely a contrived invocation of Brown's celebrity
to market or advertise the game) the court (i) ruled for defendant on Brown's
false endorsement claim]23 and allowed the use, 124 and (ii) declined
118. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989).
119. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *11-12.
120. Id. at *8. (quoting Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d
950, 958 (9th Cir. 2009)). Such automatic bestowal of literary expression sta-
tus to video games, however, is not without criticism. See Ronald S. Katz,
Courts, Sports and Video Games: What's In A Game?, Law360, Jan. 4, 2012,
available at http://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/News-and Events/News-
letters/ManattSports/Courts,%20Sports%20and%2OVideogames.pdf ("[The Su-
preme Court's] sweeping references to character, plot and social messages [in
connection with video games] are completely irrelevant to such videogames as
Pong, which has as its only object getting a moving dot past a moving line.
Pong expresses nothing. It's just a game and, as such, has no claim to First
Amendment protection."). Video games run the gamut from Pong and Pac Man
to World of Warcraft and involve differing degrees of expressive content.
Moreover, as discussed below, focusing on the expressive value of the subject
work misses the point in right of publicity disputes. The issue is not whether
the work contains sufficient creative elements so as to be considered expres-
sive, but rather to what extent has the defendant's expressive contributions
transformed the plaintiff's image or persona. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
121. Brown, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 131387, at *10-11; Rogers, 875 F.2d 994.
122. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *8.
123. Id. at *13-14. In connection with Brown's false endorsement claim, the court
further found that, under Rogers, an unauthorized but relevant use of a persona
could still be prohibited if the prospect of consumer confusion (as to whether
Brown had in fact endorsed the video game) outweighed the public interest in
free expression. Id. at * 13. The court concluded that there was no such likeli-
hood of confusion in the case before it. Id. at *14.
124. Id. at *15.
The Madden NFL character that Brown alleges bears his likeness is one of
thousands of virtual athletes in the games. Unlike most of the other char-
acters, this virtual athlete is anonymous: he is identified only by a jersey
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jurisdiction over Brown's state law publicity claim and dismissed the
complaint. 125
Although the Brown court resolved only the false endorsement claim, its
findings regarding the relevance of Jim Brown's persona to the subject work
is also key to balancing First Amendment and publicity rights interests under
the Rogers test. In fact, under Rogers, the assessment of the relevance of the
plaintiff's persona is dispositive in resolving First Amendment/publicity dis-
putes because, unlike false endorsement claims, there is no secondary assess-
ment as to whether the use is also prohibitively confusing.12 6 In this regard,
publicity rights are narrower than false endorsement rights, since if the unau-
thorized use is found expressively relevant, the right of publicity analysis is
over and the use is allowed.
While the Brown court invokes established mechanisms27 in assessing
the plaintiffs claims, its selection and application of these mechanisms re-
flects a misunderstanding of the social utility interests implicated in the dis-
pute. To start, the Brown court misstates, and arguably misapplies, the
Rogers test. Whereas the Rogers court sought to determine whether the use
of Ginger Rogers' name in the title of a movie was "'wholly unrelated"' to
the film,i28 the Brown court rearticulates the Rogers test as calling for a level
of relevance that is only "'above zero."'129 Not only does such a standard
essentially eliminate the relevance assessment, it all but guarantees that the
unauthorized use of any notable individual's persona will always be permit-
number and his roster position as a running back. The character, and
Brown's name, are not depicted on the games' packaging or in their adver-
tising.... Brown has not pointed to any Madden NFL promotional materi-
als that feature his name or likeness.
Id. at *13.
125. Id. at *15.
126. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
127. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at * 12. There is no shortage of tests
for evaluating the parameters of the right of publicity as against the First
Amendment. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (D.N.J.
2011) ("Courts throughout the United States have utilized up to eight 'balanc-
ing' tests that attempt to weigh the First Amendment rights of an author/creator
against the right of publicity."). The variety of tests, their differing assessment
emphases, and their derivation from other areas of intellectual property law
suggest a compelling need for an overarching right of publicity social utility
schema that retrofits the right into the intellectual property social utility regime.
128. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
129. Brown, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 131387, at *9-10 (quoting E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc.
v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008)); c.f Grimaldi,
875 F.2d at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d
454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979)).
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ted on First Amendment grounds. 30 Under the Brown re-interpretation of
Rogers, the use of Jim Brown's persona in any work concerning football,
sports, movie stars, or even popular trends of the 1960s or 1970s would be
permissible under the First Amendment because Jim Brown's personal ac-
complishments are "relevant" to each of those subjects (and many others).
Even the personas of non-celebrities would be vulnerable to boundless unau-
thorized exploitation under Brown, as any notable achievement will have
more than "zero relevance" to any work or product which involves the same
subject matter. 31
The Brown court seems to miss the point of the Rogers test. In Rogers,
the defendant's parody-like use of Ginger Rogers's name infused the defen-
dant's use with the kind of relevance to the defendant's film that negated any
inference that the invocation of Ginger Rogers's persona was merely a "dis-
guised advertisement" to promote the movie.132 Indeed, with only minimal
investigation, Ginger Rogers's fans would quickly discover that the film had
nothing to do with the iconic movie star, and thus the title "Ginger and Fred"
is not likely to induce Ginger Rogers's fans to buy tickets to the film. By
contrast, the key "relevance" of Jim Brown's persona to Madden NFL is that
its inclusion fulfills the game's promise that players will have the opportunity
to "compete" against Jim Brown. While this use is certainly "relevant" to the
work, it is principally "relevant" to generating consumer interest in purchas-
ing and playing Madden NFL. Unlike Rogers, Brown does not appear to
distinguish between expressive/artistic relevance and commercial/promo-
tional relevance.
In reducing the Rogers relevance test to an "above zero" standard, the
Brown court failed to account for the fact that, although Jim Brown's football
exploits are indeed an important and "relevant" part of football history, not
130. In Rogers, the relevance of Ginger Rogers' persona to the expressive work at
issue was akin to that of parody: the film was about two fictional and un-
glamorous Italian dancer contemporaries of the Rogers and Astaire team, and
was intended as a social commentary on Hollywood and television facades and
hypocrisies. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97. By comparison, a film on the history
of dance throughout the world entitled Ginger and Fred should not satisfy the
Rogers test merely because Rogers and Astaire's accomplishments are impor-
tant in the field; such a result would conflate "historical" and "relevant" and
render inert the Rogers' relevance requirement. See id. at 1001.
131. See Nature's Way Prods., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245, 253
(D. Utah 1990) (mem. op.) ("[Defendants] are using an historical fact to market
a different product .... Defendants' historical exception argument, if granted,
would work to cause essentially every right of publicity case to fail on the basis
that every truthful reference to a famous person in connection with an adver-
tised product could be considered to be 'historical information.' Because 'his-
torical information' is being used in the instant case to market a product that is
independent of the information itself, defendants' argument is without merit
and is rejected."); supra text accompanying note 107.
132. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004-05.
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every invocation of Brown's accomplishments or attributes is undertaken for
its historical value. The replication of Jim Brown's "statistical attributes" as
an avatar in a commercially distributed video game or similar product might
otherwise be undertaken primarily for its commercial marketing appeal, or
perhaps even for a combination of promotional and expressive purposes. 133
In such cases, an "above zero" relevance standard overlooks any exploitative
purpose or effects arising from the use of the persona, and all but the most
blatant misappropriations of an individual's publicity rights become permis-
133. The Rogers court made this observation in connection with the unauthorized
use of a persona in the title of an artistic work. "Titles, like the artistic works
they identify, are of a hybrid nature, combining artistic expression and com-
mercial promotion. The title of a movie may be both an integral element of the
film-maker's expression as well as a significant means of marketing the film to
the public." Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998. Other courts have reached similar con-
clusions. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447, 453-54, 561 (6th
Cir. 2003) (discussing use of plaintiff's name as a song title and holding that
"the First Amendment cannot permit anyone who cries 'artist' to have carte
blanche when it comes to naming and advertising his or her works, art though
it may be.... If the requirement of 'relevance' is to have any meaning at all, it
would not be unreasonable to conclude that the title Rosa Parks is not relevant
to the content of the song in question. The use of this woman's name unques-
tionably was a good marketing tool-Rosa Parks was likely to sell far more
recordings than Back of the Bus-but its use could be found by a reasonable
finder of fact to be a flagrant deception on the public regarding the actual con-
tent of this song and the creation of an impression that Rosa Parks ... had also
approved or sponsored the use of her name on Defendants' composition ...
[W]e believe that Parks' right of publicity claim presents a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the question of whether the title to the song is or is not
'wholly unrelated' to the content of the song. A reasonable finder of fact...
upon consideration of all the evidence, could find the title to be a 'disguised
commercial advertisement' or adopted 'solely to attract attention' to the work."
(ciations omitted) (some emphasis added)). In sum, Rogers and Parks would
not allow a promotional use of a publicity persona to provide the kind of con-
nection to the defendant's work that would enable the unauthorized use to pass
the "wholly unrelated" test. Moreover, these cases do not preclude the possi-
bility of a mixed expressive/promotional use. There is no reason that aspects of
a legendary football Hall of Famer persona could not be used in a similar hy-
brid manner in a football video game, thereby rendering the expression at least
partially commercial speech in nature and diluting its First Amendment status.
See McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The Human Per-
sona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, supra note 67, at 137
("[Clommercial speech . .. is a form of free speech but is not given nearly as
much protection as traditional political or entertainment speech."). In mixed
expressive/promotional use situations, the issue may not be that of the plain-
tiff's publicity interests being at odds with a compelling societal interest in free
speech, but rather simply one of deciding as between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant how the fruits of the commercial exploitation of the plaintiffs persona
should be allocated.
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sible.134 Thus, the social utilities underlying the right of publicity are unduly
diminished under Brown.
As troubling as the Brown court's misapplication of Rogers is, however,
it is not the most problematic deficiency in the court's analysis. The court's
most significant error is the fact that it relied upon the Rogers test in the first
place. Rogers involved the use of a person's name in the title of a work;
Brown concerns the use of aspects of an individual's persona in the expres-
sive work itself. The appropriate test for assessing a purported First Amend-
ment use of a persona within an expressive work is not Rogers, but rather is
the transformative test first enunciated in Comedy III Productions, Inc., v.
Gary Saderup, Inc.135
In Comedy III, the defendant reproduced the photographic likenesses of
the Three Stooges onto t-shirts, which he sold commercially.136 In response
to claims for infringement upon the Three Stooges' publicity rights, defen-
dant argued that he had a First Amendment right to engage in his use-in
essence, a right to "express himself' by reproducing and disseminating the
Three Stooges' images.137 In balancing the defendant's asserted First
Amendment claims against the plaintiffs' publicity rights, the court deline-
ated the property interests and social utilities encompassed by the right of
publicity:
What the right of publicity holder possesses is not a right of
censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating the
economic value generated by the celebrity's fame through the
merchandising of the "name, voice, signature, photograph, or like-
ness" of the celebrity.
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction
or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespass-
ing on the right of publicity without adding significant expression
beyond that trespass, the state law interest in protecting the fruits
of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative
artist.
134. See Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *12. "Zero relevant" commer-
cial uses of an individual's persona, such as using Jim Brown's picture to sell
cars or cookies would of course be actionable even under Brown. Limiting
publicity claims to such infractions, however, improperly narrows the right and
disregards its broader social benefits.
135. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 798 (Cal. 2001)
(formulating "a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity based on whether the work in question adds significant creative ele-
ments so as to be transformed into something more than a mere celebrity like-
ness or imitation.").
136. Id. at 800-01.
137. Id. at 802.
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We ask, in other words, whether a product containing a ce-
lebrity's likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily
the defendant's own expression rather than the celebrity's
likeness. 138
Given that the defendant had reproduced exact replicas of the Three
Stooges' likenesses, the court held that the images had been in no way
"transformed" and that "the marketability and economic value of [the defen-
dant's] work derives primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted.
While that fact alone does not necessarily mean the work receives no First
Amendment protection, we can perceive no transformative elements in [the
defendant's] works that would require such protection."'39
Recently, in No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., the court applied
the Comedy III test to facts analogous to those at issue in Brown.140 In No
Doubt, a computer-generated likeness of the rock band No Doubt was used in
certain ways in a video game without the band's permission. 141 Since the use
of No Doubt's persona was within the subject work, the court did not apply
the Rogers test for evaluating titles, but instead applied the Comedy III trans-
formative test.142 The defendant argued that it satisfied the Comedy III test
because it made various expressive contributions in creating the video game,
but the court disagreed with that interpretation of the transformative test.14 3
Notwithstanding the defendant's expressive contributions to the game as a
whole, the court found that the defendant had not altered or transformed No
Doubt's image, and thus the video game simply depicted the band "doing
what they do" (performing rock music):
In [the video game] Band Hero .. .no matter what else occurs in the
game during the depiction of the No Doubt avatars, the avatars perform rock
songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and maintains its fame.
Moreover, the avatars perform those songs as literal recreations of the band
members. That the avatars can be manipulated to perform at fanciful venues
including outer space or to sing songs the real band would object to singing,
or that the avatars appear in the context of a videogame that contains many
other creative elements, does not transform the avatars into anything other
138. Id. at 807-09 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
139. Id. at 811.
140. 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400-01, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
141. Id. at 400, 402. No Doubt had agreed that their likenesses could be used in the
game, but complained that Activision went beyond the parties' agreement and
used their likenesses in ways they did not and would never consent to. Id.
142. Id. at 406.
143. Id. at 410.
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than exact depictions of No Doubt's members doing exactly what they do as
celebrities. 144
Comedy III and No Doubt therefore hold that where the use of an indi-
vidual's persona in a work merely depicts the individual "as she is," the de-
fendant has not undertaken any expressive transformation of the persona and
is merely exploiting the individual's recognizable likeness, i.e., the marketa-
bility and commercial value derives from the fame of the depicted
celebrity:145
144. Id. at 410-11; accord Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130,
113 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("[Defendant's] depiction of Plaintiff in 'NCAA Foot-
ball' is not sufficiently transformative to bar his California right of publicity
claims as a matter of law. In the game, the quarterback for Arizona State Uni-
versity shares many of Plaintiff's characteristics. For example, the virtual
player wears the same jersey number, is the same height and weight and hails
from the same state. EA's depiction of Plaintiff is far from the transmogrifica-
tion [in prior cases]. EA does not depict Plaintiff in a different form; he is
represented as he what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State Uni-
versity. Further ... the game's setting is identical to where the public found
Plaintiff during his collegiate career: on the football field.") (footnote omitted).
In Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., the New Jersey District Court applied the transform-
ative test to another EA video game but reached a different result. 808 F. Supp.
2d 757, 787 (D.N.J. 2011). The court found a "transformation" despite the fact
that the plaintiff's likeness was presented unaltered and in his professional/
celebrity setting (the football field). Id. at 783. In arriving at this conclusion,
the court focused on the defendant's contributions to the video game as a
whole, including the fact that users can alter the plaintiffs image using "add-
ons" designed by the defendant. Id. at 785. While the court acknowledged that
"[i]t Seem[ed] ludicrous to question whether video game consumers enjoy and,
as a result, purchase more EA-produced video games as a result of the height-
ened realism associated with actual players,"' it nonetheless concluded that the
use was transformative and entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. at 783,
787. The problem with this analysis is that it seems to reach for some kind of
"copyright gestalt," allowing the copyrightable elements of the game to color
its ultimate characterization of the defendant's use of the plaintiff's image.
However, the issue is not whether the game contains creative contributions.
Nor is the issue whether the defendant provides users with the tools such that
they might transform the plaintiff's image (whose image the court concedes is
one of the reasons that users purchase the game in the first place). Rather, the
issue is whether the defendant transformed the plaintiff's image in developing
and marketing the game-which as the court expressly notes-the defendant
did not do. Id. at 783. Therefore, under the Hart analysis, a celebrity-image
coloring book would pass the transformative test, provided it included ancillary
aesthetics and was sold complete with crayons.
145. See No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 410-11, 415; Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001); see also Keller, 94
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135 (holding that the court's "focus must be on the
depiction of Plaintiff in [the video game,] not the game's other elements.").
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Activision's use of life-like depictions of No Doubt performing songs is
motivated by the commercial interest in using the band's fame to market
Band Hero, because it encourages the band's sizeable fan base to purchase
the game so as to perform as, or alongside, the members of No Doubt. Thus,
insofar as the depiction of No Doubt is concerned, the graphics and other
background content of the game are secondary, and the expressive elements
of the game remain "manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a
conventional portrait of [No Doubt] so as to commercially exploit [its]
fame."146
Such were also the circumstances Brown: the plaintiff was simply de-
picted "doing what he does"147 in order to generate consumer interest in the
video game. As the Supreme Court noted in Zacchini, however, "'[n]o so-
cial purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally
pay.' "148
146. No Doubt, 122 CAL. RPTR. 3d at 411 (quoting Comedy 111, 21 P.3d at 810); see
also Comedy 11I, 21 P.3d at 807 ("It is admittedly not a simple matter to de-
velop a test that will unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic expression
protected by the First Amendment and those that must give way to the right of
publicity .... What the right of publicity holder possesses is not a right of
censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating the economic
value generated by the celebrity's fame through the merchandising of the
'name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness' of the celebrity."); Heimes,
supra note 77, at 158 ("An individual's interests in identity protection should
not be lesser than-or greater than-First Amendment interests or other social
and cultural norms law seekks to foster and protect. They are central to the
individual's rights to self-determination and freedom. Indeed, although courts
are not as likely to recognize for non-celebrities the powerful publicity rights
granted to [prominent individuals and celebrities], there is no justification
under social justice theories to deprive other individuals of the right to prevent
misappropriation of their identities or commercial exploitation by others. If we
are to allow commodification of identity we should give universal access to
such rights.").
147. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., Case No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 131387, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
148. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (citing
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966), available at http:/scholarship.
law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3112&context=lcp); See also Mc-
Carthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture - The Human Person as
Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, supra note 67, at 131 ("While
some criticize the right of publicity as posing the danger of invading our free
speech rights, in fact, for all practical purposes, the only kind of speech im-
pacted by the right of publicity is commercial speech-advertising. Not news,
not stories, not entertainment and not entertainment satire and parodys-only
advertising and similar commercial uses.").
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Finally, the Brown decision also demonstrates how a "knee-jerk" First
Amendment categorization of a mixed promotional/expressive use of a per-
sona in an unauthorized work can inadequately address the societal and con-
stituent interests implicated in such a use. 149 Moreover, the failure to employ
a more socially nuanced approach tends to promote IP imperialist overreach-
ing. Whereas the NFL and its licensees aggressively protect their copyright
and trademark interests, but it seems publicity rights of others are fair
game-or, at least, subject to narrow interpretation and application.150 Aiding
and abetting such IP Imperialist stratagems may serve IP conglomerate inter-
ests, but contravenes right-of-publicity social utility and undermines perva-
sive respect for the IP regime.151
C. Reconciling Competing Intellectual Property Social Utilities: Laws
v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. 152
Courts are increasingly confronted with another difficult social-utility
balancing problem in resolving right-of-publicity disputes: preserving any
authorized copyright interests that favor allowing the unauthorized use of
publicity rights subsumed within the copyrighted work. A wholly unautho-
rized expressive work may require the invocation of the First Amendment to
insulate the unauthorized publicity use. However, an authorized expressive
149. See Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (holding that even where First
Amendment protections are relevant to an unauthorized use, "it does not follow
that these protections are absolute and always trump the right of publicity.").
But cf Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 769-71 (wherein the court appears to offer a
Hobson's choice of "either commercial speech or expressive use," overlooking
the possibility a hybrid commercial motivation and result).
150. Kaburakis, supra note 12; Thomas, supra note 12 (describing suit against the
N.C.A.A. and its affiliates for allegedly "usurping the rights of former players
to earn royalties when their likenesses and images are licensed by the N.C.A.A.
for use in television advertisements, video games, apparel and other products");
see also Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132-33 (in which plaintiff alleges
that the NCAA prohibits student athletes from commercially exploiting their
personas, and, in turn, takes advantage of that prohibition to exploit their per-
sonas for its own pecuniary benefit).
151. See, e.g., Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811 (disallowing unauthorized use where "the
marketability and economic value of [the resulting] work derives primarily
from the fame of the celebrities depicted."); see also Spare the Mod: In Support
of Total-Conversion Modified Video Games, supra note 49, at 800 ("A more
fruitful approach within [the labor theory of intellectual property protections]
may be to move away from traditional Lockean labor theory and toward an
analysis based on equity theory. This approach focuses on distributive justice
based on individual contributions to a joint venture. Equity theory essentially
says that what is fair is what is proportional. When determining how to divide
surpluses, individuals rely on a complex social index comprising empathetic
preferences and a natural sense of fair play.") (footnotes omitted).
152. 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).
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work will implicate traditional copyright interests, such as the right to
reproduce or distribute the work, which may conflict with any legitimate
publicity rights also present in the work. Similar to the First-Amendment-
versus-right-of-publicity cases, courts seem to have difficulty placing public-
ity interests on par with copyright interests, often displaying a "knee-jerk"
deference to copyright claims.
Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., provides a particularly interest-
ing example of the problem. The publicity interests involved in the case,
although subtle, are extremely significant from an IP social justice perspec-
tive. The plaintiff, Debra Laws, was an Elektra recording artist and Elektra
held the copyrights in Laws' sound recordings.53 When Laws initially
signed with Elektra, however, the company expressly agreed that "'we or our
licensees shall not, without your prior written consent, sell records embody-
ing the Masters hereunder for use as premiums or in connection with the
sale, advertising or promotion of any other product or service."' "54
Elektra subsequently granted Sony a license to sample a seg-
ment from one of Laws' recordings into a song by singer artist
Jennifer Lopez, whereupon Laws brought suit against Sony for
misappropriation of her name and voice.155 Sony ultimately
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Laws' suit was
essentially one for unauthorized reproduction of her copyrighted
sound performance, which Sony argued was preempted by copy-
right law.156 Laws argued, however, that her misappropriation
claims were substantively different from claims for copyright
infringement:
Laws . . . contends that the subject matter of a copyright
claim and a right of publicity claim are substantively different.
She argues that a copyright claim protects ownership rights to a
work of art, while a right of publicity claim concerns the right to
protect one's persona and likeness. Sony, by contrast, contends
that the subject matter of a right of publicity in one's voice is not
different from a copyright claim when the voice is embodied
within a copyrighted sound recording. Sony argues that once a
voice becomes part of a sound recording in a fixed tangible me-
dium it comes within the subject matter of copyright law.157
153. Id. at 1136.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 1137. Laws also commenced a breach of contract action against Elektra.
Id. at 1143 n.5.
156. Id. at 1136. Having assigned her copyrights to Elektra, Laws lacked standing to
assert a copyright infringement claim against Sony. Id. at 1147.
157. Id. at 1139.
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Sony reasoned that, because it had used a copyrighted recording of
Laws' voice, her state misappropriation rights were subsumed within the
copyrights attendant to that recording.158 The court agreed:
[W]e think it is clear that federal copyright law preempts a
claim alleging misappropriation of one's voice when the entirety
of the allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is contained
within a copyrighted medium ...
... [Moreover] Sony did not use Laws's image, name, or the
voice recording in any promotional materials. Her state tort action
challenges control of the artistic work itself and could hardly be
more closely related to the subject matter of the Copyright Act. 159
The court further held that, to the extent that Laws' state law clams
required an "extra element" beyond those that constitute a claim for copy-
right infringement, these elements were insufficiently distinctive to avoid
copyright preemption:
Laws contends that her right of publicity claim under Califor-
nia Civil Code § 3344 requires proof of a use for a "commercial
purpose," which is not an element of a copyright infringement
claim. She concedes that a right which is the "equivalent to copy-
right" is one that is infringed by the mere act of reproduction;
however, she argues that her claim is not based on Sony's mere
act of reproduction, but "is for the use of ... Laws'[s] voice, the
combination of her voice with another artist, and the commercial
exploitation of her voice and name in a different product without
her consent."
[However,] the mere presence of an additional element ([in
this case] "commercial use") . . . is not enough to qualitatively
distinguish Laws's right of publicity claim from a claim in copy-
right. The extra element must transform the nature of the action.
Although the elements of Laws's state law claims may not be
identical to the elements in a copyright action, the underlying na-
ture of Laws's state law claims is part and parcel of a copyright
claim.160
158. Id.
159. Laws, 448 F.3d at 1141-42.
160. Id. at 1144 (citations omitted). For a similar copyright preemption analysis, see
Toney v. L'Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding
that "because the exercise of the [defendant copyright holder's] rights to
reproduce, adapt, publish, or display the photos would also infringe upon [the
plaintiffs] right to publicity in her likeness in photographic form, her publicity
right is equivalent to the rights encompassed by copyright listed in § 106.").
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While Laws is in some ways a close analytical case, the Laws court,
much like the Brown court, seems unduly deferential to the copyright inter-
ests implicated in the case-almost to the point of ignoring settled federal
intellectual property law preemption precedent.61 Once again a court has
failed to give proper weight to the full range of social utilities that support
the plaintiff's right of publicity interests.
With respect to the defendant's copyright claims, the court's preemption
analysis certainly leaves something to be desired. The court's reading of the
additional-element test is unduly constrained. Moreover, the court seems to
presume that the presence of a copyright in the original sound recording used
by Sony completely negates the possibility of additional, alternative intellec-
tual property rights and interests in, as well as non-copyright uses for, the
work. Courts and commentators have long recognized the possibilities for
co-existing intellectual property rights in a single work, and have afforded
due consideration to each such interest.162 In a reactionary effort to protect
the sanctity of copyright, the court overlooks the fact that a copyrighted work
can be used for a primarily promotional purpose unrelated to the work itself
or its expressive message. 63
While Sony's sampling use of Laws' recording certainly involved some
expressive intentions and effects, it was also arguably a use undertaken to
provide "street cred" to the Jennifer Lopez recording and thereby to promote
it (and Lopez) to the "urban" and R&B commercial markets. As in No Doubt
and Brown, the plaintiff's persona is incorporated in to the work depicting
plaintiff "doing what she does" in order to enhance consumer interest in the
work. From this perspective, the right of publicity social utilities seem at
least as important as the copyright-expressive social utilities at issue. Moreo-
ver, when considering the issue of intellectual property social justice, the
161. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491 (1974) (holding
that state trade secret law is not preempted by federal patent law); Leonard A.
Wohl, Note, Federal Preemption of the Right of Publicity in Sing-Alike Cases,
I FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 47, 50 (1990), available at
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1003&context=IPlj
(concluding that "federal copyright law does not preempt state law rights of
publicity when such rights are infringed by imitation of a performer's voice
within the context of a copyrighted musical work").
162. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)
(suggesting that plaintiff's film footage could have been protected both by cop-
yright and by trademark law); Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 470; Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding that patentability of statuettes for use as
bases for table lamps did not bar simultaneous copyright of the statuettes as
works of art).
163. One common example is the use of vintage, classic, or "art house" cinema
posters to promote a specific movie theater. The theater may have no plans to
actually show the subject films, but rather is attempting to promote itself as a
venerable purveyor of important, high-quality cinematic entertainment.
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Lopez promotional impact becomes a critical factor in balancing the interests
at stake in the dispute. Consistent with the tradition of American IP Imperi-
alism, the recording industry has a long history of using the creative talents,
innovations, and stylizations of African-American artists to promote the
records and careers of white artists.164 This may well have been the reason
164. See, e.g., JOHN COLLIS, THE STORY OF CHESS RECORDS 117 (1998); NELSON
GEORGE, THE DEATH OF RHYTHM AND BLUES 108 (1988) ("Blacks create and
then move on. Whites document and then recycle. In the history of popular
music, these truths are self-evident."); JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, THE MAKING
OF JAZZ: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY 106 (1978); see also Olufunmilayo B.
Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and
Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 350-51 (2006); Leslie Espinoza & Angela
P. Harris, Symposium, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 499, 512-13 (1998); Greene,
"Copynorms," Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over African-Ameri-
can Reparations, supra note 45, at 1184-85, 1188-89 ("In the context of cul-
tural production, Ellisonian invisibility is concrete in all its bitter irony. In the
face of prolific and innovative Black musical creativity, '[Wlhites [in the
1920s] often vehemently denied that AfricanAmericans [sic] had made any
contribution to the creation of jazz. New Orleans "Dixieland" musicians ...
made it a point of honor never to mix with Black musicians or acknowledge
their talents.' In later years, it was widely conceded that 'though African-
Americans had certainly invented ragtime and jazz, these musical styles were
being brought to their highest levels by [White] outsiders.'") (quoting BURTON
W. PERETTI, JAZZ IN AMERICAN CULTURE 42-43 (1993)); Evans C. Anyanwu,
Note & Comment, Let's Keep it on the Download: Why the Educational Use
Factor of the Fair Use Exception Should Shield Rap Music from Infringement
Claims, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 179, 181-82 (2004); Neela
Kartha, Comment, Digital Sampling and Copyright Law in the Social Context:
No More Colorblindness!!, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 218, 219-23,
232-34 (1997) ("The compulsory license made it possible for white artists to
shanghai the African-American songbook. Pat Boone was notorious for cover-
ing Little Richard's music, and eventually, songs 'by niggers for niggers' real-
ized a catalog value as great as those of Tin Pan Alley tunesmiths. Another
unfortunate reality was that the Black songwriters and performers did not al-
ways understand the value of publishing rights which ended up being owned by
white record companies. A great deal of revenue was generated by white
groups covering Black hits .... Eric Clapton is an excellent example of an
artist who reached long term fame using a lot of unoriginal music and styles
taken from Black artists .... When he was with John Mayall's Bluesbreakers
he recorded (blues artist) Freddie King's 'Hideaway,' Otis Rush and Willie
Dixon's 'All Your Love,' Robert Johnson's 'Ramblin' On My Mind,' and later,
with the rock group Cream, he recorded 'Crossroads,' another Robert Johnson
song. When he was with Derek and the Dominos he recorded Willie Dixon's
'Evil,' Elmore James's 'The Sky Is Crying,' and later in his solo career he
imitated reggae music. He recorded some music in Jamaica (not including 'I
Shot the Sheriff) where he recorded Peter Tosh's 'Whatcha Gonna Do.' How
would Eric Clapton's career fare a 'total concept and feel' analysis like that set
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Laws negotiated the "no promotional use in connection with other artists"
clause of her contract. 65 As a "cross-over" recording artist, Jennifer Lopez
has been marketed to majority audiences and has enjoyed a multifaceted en-
tertainment career in the recording, television, movie, and now fragrance in-
dustries.166 To the extent that Lopez's mega-celebrity is fueled by the vocal
stylings of a lesser-known African-American R&B recording artist, the right
of publicity social justice implications warrant serious consideration-cer-
tainly more consideration than that given by the Laws court.
While the problem of mixed "expressive/promotional" use of publicity
rights is as challenging here as in the First Amendment context, once again it
is not intractable. In the next case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals also
confronts the problem and demonstrates a right-of-publicity social utility/so-
cial justice sensitivity more highly attuned than that demonstrated in the
cases discussed thus far.
D. Assessing the "Social Utility Authenticity" of Publicity Defenses:
Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc.167
In Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., the court confronted the same intersec-
tion of copyright and right of publicity problem that was at issue in Laws.168
However, this court employed a more nuanced analysis and reached a very
different outcome. 169 In this case, the estate of well-known football commen-
tator John Facenda brought suit when the NFL used portions of Facenda's
voice-over work from previously authorized copyrighted programs in a new,
unauthorized program concerning the football video game Madden NFL
06.170 In essence, the NFL "sampled" portions of Facenda's voice-over re-
cordings from one program into another. Facenda's Estate claimed that the
"use of Facenda's voice falsely suggested that Facenda endorsed the video
game" and also violated Facenda's right of publicity under Pennsylvania
law.17' Just as Sony argued in Laws, the NFL argued that the copyrights it
forth in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.?" (citing 429 F.2d 1106, t 110
(9th Cir. 1970)); Henry Self, Comment, Digital Sampling: A Cultural Perspec-
tive, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 347, 352-53 (2002).
165. Laws, 448 F.3d at 1136.
166. Nicole La Porte, J. Lo, The Sequel, N.Y. TIMEs, May 15, 2011, at STI, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/fashion/jennifer-lopez-the-peoples-
pop-star.html?pagewanted=all.
167. 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1032.
170. Id. at 1012-13.
171. Id. at 1011-13.
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held in the original NFL programs that Facenda narrated gave it the right to
reuse portions of those works in subsequent expressive works.172
As did the court in Brown, the Facenda court began its false endorse-
ment analysis by invoking the Rogers test.173 It first considered the threshold
question as to whether the unauthorized use was in fact expressive, as op-
posed to merely promotional:
Before considering whether either prong of the Rogers test
applies, however, we must decide whether the television produc-
tion is a "work[ ] of artistic expression," as understood in the con-
text of construing the [plaintiff's persona rights] narrowly to avoid
a conflict with the First Amendment ....
The Estate contends that the [new] program is commercial
speech, and we agree. Our Court has "three factors to consider in
deciding whether speech is commercial: (1) is the speech an ad-
vertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific product or ser-
vice; and (3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for
the speech."74
In short, the court did not presume that, because Facenda's voice was
reproduced in an expressive work, the defendant's use of Facenda's voice
was expressive. Instead, upon finding the NFL's subsequent use to be more
promotional than expressive in nature, the court distinguished the facts from
those in Rogers (which involved a parody-like use of the plaintiff's persona),
and instead applied the traditional, trademark likelihood-of-confusion analy-
sis (as tailored to false-endorsement claims).175 Finding it likely that con-
172. Id. at 1011. Just as Laws had, Facenda had expressly preserved his publicity
rights, notwithstanding his assignment of any copyrights in the original
programs:
Facenda signed a "standard release" contract stating that NFL Films en-
joys "the unequivocal rights to use the audio and visual film sequences
recorded of me, or any part of them . . . in perpetuity and by whatever
media or manner NFL Films . . . Sees fit, provided, however, such use
does not constitute an endorsement of any product or service."
Id. at 1012.
173. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1016.
174. Id. at 1016-17 (citation omitted). Thus, although the work at issue was a nar-
rative video program, unlike the court in Brown, the court here acknowledged
that an expressive work can have a promotional purpose. Not only did this
permit the court to distinguish between promotional and expressive relevance
in a manner consistent with Rogers, the Facenda approach further allows for
the recognition of mixed promotional/expressive uses of publicity personas.
175. Id. at 1018 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)). The court weighed the follow-
ing factors: the level of recognition that the plaintiff has among the segment of
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sumers would believe that Facenda had endorsed Madden NFL 06, the court
held in favor of Facenda's estate.17 6
With regard to plaintiffs right of publicity claim, the court acknowl-
edged that:
By using the sound clips of Facenda's voice . . . the NFL was
exercising its exclusive right to make derivative works of those
sound clips under § 106(2). In effect, it was "sampling" itself,
making a collage, taking a small piece of an old work and using it
in a new work-as when a hip-hop group samples the drum part
from James Brown's "Funky Drummer."177
Nonetheless, if the right of publicity is qualitatively different from the
derivative work right, it is not preempted. "In other words, for a state-law
claim to be preempted by copyright law, it must protect (1) an exclusive right
in (2) a work within copyright's subject matter."178
In direct contrast to the findings in Laws, the Facenda court concluded
that Facenda's publicity rights were distinct from copyright because:
The requirement under the [state] statute that Facenda's voice
have "commercial value," provides an additional element beyond
what a copyright-infringement claim requires....
... [In addition,] does Facenda's voice fall under the subject mat-
ter of copyright? The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
stated, in the context of vocal imitations, that "[a] voice is not
copyrightable. . . ." We hold that Facenda's voice is outside the
subject matter of copyright.179
the society for whom the defendant's product is intended; the relatedness of the
plaintiff's fame or success to the defendant's product; the similarity of the like-
ness used by the defendant to the actual plaintiff; evidence of actual confusion;
marketing channels used; likely degree of purchaser care; defendant's intent in
selecting the plaintiff; and likelihood of expansion of the product lines. Id. at
1019.
176. Id. at 1024-25. While the fact that the plaintiff's persona was used in the work
itself and not in its title suggests that the Comedy III test would be applied, here
the court found that the work was an infomercial and thus as a primarily pro-
motional work, the Rogers test seemed the most appropriate. To the extent that
the sampling in Laws was undertaken for promotional (urban marketing) and
not artistic purposes, the use is promotional as well as expressive. While not an
easy hair to split in a music sampling case, the Facenda court, unlike the Laws
court, at least considered this a possibility. Id. at 1030.
177. Id. at 1026.
178. Id.
179. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1027-28 (citations omitted).
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Finally, having distinguished Facenda's publicity rights from the NFL's
copyright claims, the court directly addressed the apparent conflict between
the competing rights:
[I]n some situations . . . the right of publicity clashes with the
exploitation of a defendant's copyright. Unlike the plaintiffs in
cases involving vocal imitations, Facenda collaborated with the
NFL to create the copyrighted sound recordings at issue.... this
gives the NFL a stronger preemption defense than the vocal-imita-
tion defendants. . . . Where a defendant in a right-of-publicity
claim obtained a copyright in a work featuring the plaintiff, courts
must separate legitimate exploitations of what Congress intended
to be a copyright holder's exclusive rights from particular uses
that infringe the right of publicity.80
Thus, even where the right of publicity is qualitatively different from a
copyright exclusive right (and therefore not automatically preempted), en-
forcement of the publicity right may interfere with the copyright holder's
exploitation and use of one or more of her exclusive rights. In such a case,
the right of publicity might be preempted on that basis. To determine
whether Facenda's publicity rights conflicted with the NFL's exclusive copy-
rights in the original program, the court set forth an analytical road map:
First, we look to how the copyrighted work featuring the
plaintiff's identity is used. Surveying the case law, [David] Nim-
mer finds that when defendants use the work "for the purposes of
trade," such as in an advertisement, plaintiffs' right-of-publicity
claims have not been held to be preempted.
The second part of Nimmer's framework addresses the way
that contracts affect the preemption analysis. Nimmer proposes
that courts should examine the purpose of the use to which the
plaintiff initially consented when signing over the copyright in a
contract. He argues that the proper question in cases involving
advertising and a contract between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant-such as our case-is whether the plaintiff "collaborated in
the creation of a copyrighted advertising product." If the plaintiff
did collaborate in that fashion, then the party holding the copy-
right is in a very strong position to contend that allowing the
plaintiff to assert a right of publicity against use of its likeness in
advertising would interfere with the rights it acquired. If, on the
other hand, the plaintiff did not collaborate specifically in the cre-
ation of advertising content, then the plaintiff is in a strong posi-
tion to assert continuing control over the use of his image.81
180. Id. at 1028 (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 1028-30 (citations omitted).
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Just as was the case in Laws, (i) Facenda had not collaborated in the
creation of the subsequent program, and (ii) he expressly reserved his public-
ity rights when he agreed to narrate the original NFL programs. 8 2 Moreover,
the court had already determined, in connection with the disposition of
Facenda's false endorsement claim, that the NFL's later use was more pro-
motional than expressive in nature. 83 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the NFL did not have a legitimate copyright expectation that it would be able
to use Facenda's voice work in the original program for subsequent promo-
tional purposes unrelated to the original program.184 Consequently, the court
held that Facenda's right of publicity was not preempted by the NFL's copy-
rights in the original programs.185
182. Id. at 1031.
183. Id. at 1030.
184. Id. at 1031-32. Under David Nimmer's analysis, the NFL would probably be
able to use Facenda's voice work to promote the original program itself as an
anticipated use of the NFL's exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, and dis-
play the program.
185. Facenda, 542 F.3d 1032; accord, Alberghetti v. Corbis Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d
971 (C.D. Cal. 2010), affid in part, rev'd in part, Nos. 10-56311, 10-56400,
2012 WL 3646341 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2012). Interestingly, the Facenda court
nonetheless expressed agreement with the ultimate decision in Laws, despite
the fact that it differed in its disposition of virtually every substantive issue.
Compare Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir.
2006) (dismissing the plaintiff's intellectual property claims and holding that
"[t]o the extent that Laws has enforceable, contractual rights regarding the use
of Elektra's copyright, her remedy may lie in a breach of contract claim against
Elektra for licensing 'Very Special' without her authorization."), with Facenda,
542 F.3d at 1031-32 ("The NFL argues that Facenda's only remedy should lie
in contract. While we agree that Facenda could state a claim for breach of
contract, we believe that he also retained his tort-derived remedy for violation
of Pennsylvania's right-of-publicity statute. Parties may waive tort remedies
via contract. It follows that they may also preserve them."). Indeed, the prof-
fered basis for the court's approval of Laws presents a factual mismatch.
[W]e believe that Laws was rightly decided-Debra Laws sought to en-
force a right that she had contracted away. We do not intend to express
any disagreement with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals by distinguish-
ing the facts of our case from those of Laws. Our case simply presents a
different scenario than Laws. Just as Facenda did not, in the standard re-
lease contract, waive the right to bring a false-endorsement claim . . . he
did not grant the NFL the right to use his voice in a promotional television
program. This contrasts with the situation in Laws. Debra Laws' voice
was not used in an endorsement, but in a work of artistic expression.
[Moreover,] [h]aving one's voice used as a sample in someone else's song
may implicate a musician's identity. But listeners are probably less likely
to assume that the sampled musician vouches for or approves of a new
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PART V: PROMOTING SOCIAL JUSTICE THROUGH THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCING THE
RIGHT AND BALANCING COUNTERVAILING
SOCIAL UTILITIES
Although the court in Facenda does not expressly rest its decision on a
social justice interpretation and application of right-of-publicity law, its rea-
soning is consistent with intellectual property social justice mandates and
illustrates the benefits of a socially balanced approach to right-of-publicity
disputes. Unlike the courts in Brown and Laws, the Facenda court did not
presume that the social utility interests that appeared to conflict with the
plaintiff's publicity rights were superior to the social utility objectives which
underlie the right of publicity, or, for that matter, that these competing inter-
ests were even socially significant. Instead the court endeavored to assess
the social utility authenticity of the asserted copyright claims and then
weighed it against the plaintiff's publicity interests. This careful approach
restores the right of publicity to its proper place in the intellectual property
pantheon:
[A] defendant's ownership of copyright or a license of copy-
right in a particular photograph, motion picture or phonorecord of
plaintiff should not be a defense to assertion of infringement of
plaintiff's right of publicity. A copyright, no more than any other
property right, cannot be a license to trample on other people's
rights. A copyrighted book or motion picture is certainly capable
of defaming people, yet no one seriously argues that because the
book or film is copyrighted, its contents are free from claims of
libel under state law....
All of these sorts of liability for violation of state law in one
way or another "interfere" with the federal "rights" of a copyright
owner. That an owner of property is not completely free to do as
he or she wishes with the property should be no news to the owner
of any property right.186
By pausing to determine the nature and extent of the copyright legal and
social interests at issue and then carefully considering whether they are, in
fact, directly in conflict with the plaintiff's publicity interests, the Facenda
creative work that samples her work than consumers are likely to assume
that an individual's presence in an advertisement reflects an active choice
to endorse a product.
Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1032 & n.16. While the court initially appears to com-
pare the respective contracts in the different cases, it ultimately distinguishes
Laws on an entirely different basis.
186. McCarthy, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture-The Human Persona
as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, supra note 67, at 143-44
(footnote omitted).
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court uncovered the true tension between the parties' respective intellectual
property rights. The defendant's desire to use its copyright to commercially
exploit aspects of Facenda's persona was at direct odds with the plaintiffs
desire to obtain compensation for the promotional (non-copyright) use of that
persona. Once the presumption of "copyright social superiority" was re-
moved from the equation, a more accurate and equitable balancing of the
parties' interests could be achieved-and the right of publicity's social jus-
tice objectives more properly served. Equity favors that plaintiffs benefit
from the commercial exploitation of their personas:
[T]he right of publicity is not restricted to superstar, nation-
ally known athletes and entertainers. It applies to everyone. For
example, it applies to the long distance runner who won an
Olympic medal twenty years ago, is now selling insurance in Iowa
and whose name and accomplishments are printed today on a box
of breakfast cereal to help sell the cereal. Who is more entitled to
that commercial value? The former Olympian or the breakfast ce-
real conglomerate?....
Look at the recent cases involving well-known celebrities.
How would you decide which party is most deserving and whether
the award of damages distributed wealth "upwards"? Would you
pick Samsung Electronics, a Korean electronics firm with $10 bil-
lion in annual sales as more deserving than letter turner Vanna
White? Would you pick Frito- Lay, with $4.4 billion a year in
sales and which is owned by Pepsi Cola, with $25 billion of sales
a year, as more deserving of the marketing value of Tom Waits'
voice than Tom Waits himself? I would not.187
187. Id. at 141 (footnote omitted). The choice is especially poignant where members
of marginalized groups have developed highly valuable publicity personas. See,
e.g., Jacoby, supra note 85, at 1330-31 ("Tiger Woods is primarily a profes-
sional golfer and clearly is well-compensated for his performance on the golf
course. But he reportedly earned an additional fifty to sixty million dollars in
2000 alone by licensing out the use of his face and his name to companies that
want to use them to promote products. He has a contract with Nike, for exam-
ple, to license sports gear and merchandise, like posters of Woods, to his fans
and admirers. Woods, in fact, has set up a corporation, ETW, for the sole
purpose of managing his publicity rights. Michael Jordan, before his last 're-
tirement' from professional basketball, was reported to have earned forty mil-
lion dollars in a single year by allowing his name to be used in connection with
sneakers, underwear, and telephone service.") (footnote omitted). The corpora-
tions that utilize the personas of these athletes earn billions through these mar-
keting mechanisms, and it is difficult to see why the athletes themselves should
not share in this wealth.
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A. A Right of Publicity Social Justice Framework
A social-justice sensitive-interpretation of the right of publicity not only
promotes the IP social objectives of inclusion and empowerment, it also in-
vigorates the doctrinal foundations of the right such that it stands on par with
the other rights that comprise the American IP regime. As illustrated by
Facenda, appreciation for publicity right social utility/social justice interde-
pendence removes the stigma of "IP Illegitimacy" and grants publicity rights
a status equal to that enjoyed by its IP forbears. Many right-of-publicity
adjudications, however, often indicate a lack of effective social justice divi-
nation tools essential to achieving such results.
Right-of-publicity jurisprudence could benefit from the development of
an analytical framework through which the social utilities that undergird pub-
licity rights might be more concretely identified and assessed, particularly
where competing social objectives are involved. Based upon the analyses of
the litigation disputes discussed herein, as well as other publicity cases,
courts should consider following four evaluative steps:
Identify and evaluate the specific publicity social utilities and social jus-
tice interests at issue;
Identify and evaluate any competing social utility/social justice
interests;
Select and properly apply an appropriate social balancing test; and
Consider the equities and the rule of eBay vs. Mercexchange, L.L.C. 188
in balancing the respective rights and social interests.
B. Identifying the Pertinent Right of Publicity Social Utility and
Social Justice Concerns
While the identification and evaluation of publicity right social utilities
may seem an obvious initial step in adjudicating publicity disputes, many
courts seem to overlook it, especially when the publicity defendant raises the
First Amendment banner. Courts routinely review the legal elements of the
right of publicity cause of action and typically end their analysis of the plain-
tiff's interests there. Once potentially contrary social considerations are in-
troduced, some courts seem to simply take for granted that any analogous
publicity interests are comparatively inferior. This is one reason why the
right of publicity fares so poorly when courts undertake to "balance" the
competing social interests in these disputes. Given the at best perfunctory
review of the publicity social function, especially as compared with the al-
most pious analysis generally afforded even nominal First Amendment argu-
ments, it should come as no surprise that the publicity social interest weighs
in as a bantam-class amateur facing off against a heavy-weight champion-
the fight is over before the first bell rings.
Right-of-publicity advocates should assist courts in becoming more cog-
nizant of any relevant publicity social utility and social justice interests that
188. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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could affect publicity litigation outcomes. The court in Parks did not have to
look far to find an important right of publicity social utility/social justice
interest in the case before it: she was sitting in the plaintiff's chair.189 How-
ever, not all right-of-publicity plaintiffs have the status of a Civil Rights icon,
and there is a need for greater social insight, intuition, and common sense in
the adjudication of these disputes.190 Disregard for right of publicity social
justice increases the likelihood of miscarriages of justice both as a matter of
intellectual property rights enforcement and as a matter of general fairness,
justice, and equality before the law. Proper appreciation for the social func-
tions of publicity rights will better enable courts to avoid patently unjust
outcomes such as that in Brooks and similar cases. Moreover, it will enhance
judicial capability to fulfill the overarching policy objectives supporting the
inclusion of publicity rights in the intellectual property positive law
regime. 191
C. Identifying and Evaluating Competing Social Utilities and
Interests
Unlike right of publicity social utilities, courts almost always afford se-
rious weight to the First Amendment and non-publicity IP social utilities
which arise in publicity disputes. The problem is that great deference is
189. See 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
190. See Danielle M. Conway, Intellectual Property: Implicit Racial and Gender
Bias in Right of Publicity Cases and Intellectual Property Law Generally, in
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 179, 180 (Justin D. Levinson & Rob-
ert J. Smith eds., 2012) (arguing that, due to implicit racial biases, many courts
devalue the right-of-publicity interests of minorities and women when com-
pared with the interests of majority defendants who commercially exploited
such interests without permission); Heimes, supra note 68, at 155 ("Some eco-
nomically-based objections [to unauthorized use of publicity rights] can be
remedied through monetary payment and perhaps injunctive relief. But morally
based objections arise when the plaintiff's image or persona is used in a context
or manner that conflicts with the plaintiff's own values and interests.") (foot-
note omitted).
191. Of course, consideration of social justice imperatives will sometimes militate in
favor of sustaining an authorized use of publicity rights. See Heimes, supra
note 77, at 162 ("By putting image and language control in the hands of celeb-
rities, their estates or assignees . . . critics of expanded publicity rights worry
that the rest of society will be deprived of 'our collective cultural heritage and
the ability to reflect upon the historical significance of the celebrity aura.' The
valid social justice concerns identified here relate to the ability of members of
American society, at least, to exercise rights in speech and expression that are
embedded in our rich culture and expressly protected in our Constitution. To
allow individual private property interests in words, designs, and names-espe-
cially ones that have acquired universal recognition and thus have inherent ex-
pressive meaning-to chill creativity disserves social and cultural enhancement
in the aggregate.") (footnote omitted).
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sometimes afforded to such interests with little assessment as to the extent of
their actual presence or vulnerability in a specific publicity conflict. All as-
sertions of the First Amendment do not raise identical sets of policy ques-
tions and concerns. As demonstrated by the analyses undertaken in cases
such as Parks and Facenda, it is important that courts resist the urge to react
viscerally to invocations of free speech or "superior" intellectual property
rights and policies, and instead strive to uncover the precise nature and extent
of the non-publicity social utilities actually implicated by the specific facts
and equities before them.
D. Applying an Appropriate Balancing Test
Even when a court has properly considered all of the pertinent social
utilities and interests in a publicity dispute, it can still reach an erroneous
decision if it fails to select and properly apply an appropriate balancing-of-
the-interests test. As discussed in connection with the Brown case, the vari-
ous judicial balancing tests are not interchangeable.192
While many of the leading balancing tests were conceived with First
Amendment concerns in mind, courts must be mindful that these tests are
also intended to protect legitimate publicity interests.193 The task is not lim-
ited to assessing the impact on free speech if the unauthorized use is pre-
cluded; it also entails assessing the impact on publicity rights if the
unauthorized use is allowed.194
The importance of this point becomes evident in considering judicial
interpretations and applications of the leading publicity-balancing test, the
Comedy II transformative test.195 The purpose of the transformative test is
just as its name implies: to assess the extent the plaintiff's image or persona
is transformed in the defendant's work.196 Accordingly, the court's inquiry
should focus on any expressive embellishments that the defendant has added
to the plaintiff's image or persona to determine whether the result is more the
defendant's expressive creation (permissible) than it is merely a depiction or
replication of the plaintiff (impermissible). Some courts, however, employ
the transformative test to evaluate and weigh the overall expressive quality of
the defendant's work, which misconstrues the purpose of the test. While an
overall assessment of the defendant's expressive contributions may be rele-
vant to analyzing whether the work is copyrightable, it says little or nothing
about the impact of those contributions on the plaintiff's image and concomi-
tant publicity interests. For example, today it is possible to insert the image
192. See infra Part IV.
193. See Gloria Franke, Notes, The Right of Publicity v. the First Amendment: Will
One Test Ever Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006).
194. Id.
195. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 797 (Cal. 2001);
Franke, supra note 193, at 963.
196. Comedy 111, 21 P.3d at 808; Franke, supra note 193, at 970-71.
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of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire dancing in to a variety of new settings and
contexts, some of which may be highly creative. Unless these new settings
transform Rogers and Astaire's individual images, however, it is their public-
ity interests that are being traded upon, notwithstanding the fact that defen-
dant's work may be highly creative and artistic as a whole. 97 The issue is
particularly troublesome when courts are called upon to apply existing tests
to unauthorized publicity persona uses that are mixed promotional/expressive
uses. Facenda meets this challenge by applying the Rogers tests to expres-
sive works that are advertisements. Where the work is not an advertisement,
however, it seems appropriate to apply the Comedy III test to assess whether
the defendant has so transformed the plaintiff's persona such that the com-
mercial value or appeal of the result is not derived from plaintiff's persona.
In this regard, Comedy III, No Doubt, and Keller, properly focus on changes
to the plaintiff's image, as opposed to defendant's creative contributions to
the work as a whole.
Courts misapply right-of-publicity balancing tests when they use them
only to evaluate the First Amendment or other expressive merits of a defen-
dant's unauthorized work. Again, it is an undue emphasis on these counter-
vailing social utilities that is the source of the confusion. Regardless of how
highly expressive a work is, the court must still consider the other side of the
balance-the impact of defendant's use on the plaintiff's publicity inter-
ests-even if only to affirm that these interests are ultimately outweighed by
the competing social concerns.1 98
197. Recently the New Jersey District Court made this error in Hart v. Elec. Arts,
Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011). In deciding whether the purveyor of a
football video game had misappropriated the persona of a former college
player, the court applied the transformative test to the game as whole, despite
its conclusion that the plaintiff's image therein was readily recognizable and
presented in his usual setting "doing what he does": playing football. Id. at
783, 787. The court thus confused the issue. The point of the transformative
test is not to determine whether the defendant has made expressive, copyright-
able contributions in general, but rather, whether the defendant's expressive
contributions have so transformed the plaintiff's image so as to preclude a via-
ble publicity claim.
198. A notable weakness of the transformative test is that although it is derived from
the copyright Fair Use test, which weighs four interdependent factors, the
transformative test imports only one of its factors. Franke, supra note 193, at
968-69, 970. While the Comedy III court expressed skepticism towards reli-
ance on the remaining three factors, they need not be imported verbatim. Bor-
rowing further from the Fair Use test, those additional factors might be the
nature of defendant's work (i.e., is it expressive or promotional), the extent that
the plaintiffs image is used (whether the plaintiff is recognizable), and the
impact on the market for the plaintiff's own use of her image.
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E. Balancing the Legal Rights and Social Equities
Finally, in balancing the competing interests, it is important that the
relevant equities be included on the scales. Particularly where a weighing of
the competing social utilities presents a close case, consideration of the rele-
vant equities should tip the scales toward the side of social justice. Had the
social equities been considered in Brooks, the plaintiff's undeniably unclean
hands in its willful violation of Brooks' publicity rights, and subsequent acts
to conceal its misconduct, would have supported a tolling of the limitations
period to allow the plaintiff to proceed with an indisputably valid claim.1 9
Courts must also become more vigilant toward disguised IP Imperialist
maneuvers to annex individual publicity interests (as well as other intellec-
tual property rights) into their IP empires. A thorough assessment of the
social utility authenticity of a publicity defendant's claims is particularly crit-
ical when the defendant is a major purveyor of IP commodities and the plain-
tiff is a member of a marginalized group for whom right of publicity
incentives and benefits can provide a vital avenue for economic empower-
ment and social advancement. 200
199. See Brooks v. Topps Co., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The
question of equitable tolling of limitations periods presents a prime example of
the need to view publicity disputes through a socially equitable lens. Where
the publicity interests of non-celebrities or members of marginalized groups are
at stake, acts of misappropriation can be difficult to uncover. While the
wealthy and influential celebrity may be well poised to police the exploitation
of her persona, the law should not be fashioned or interpreted with only these
kinds of publicity plaintiffs in mind. Many celebrities from marginalized
groups, persons of historical significance, and the heirs and descendants of
same simply lack the resources to monitor the media and commercial market
place to protect their publicity interests-assuming that they are even fully
aware that such interests exist. With respect to right of publicity limitations
periods, the failure to consider the relevant equities can prove tantamount to a
de facto license to misappropriate-steal now and pay later, but only if you get
caught in time. In deciding whether to toll a publicity limitations period, a
court could consider the ability of the plaintiff to police her publicity rights
and/or uncover the specific misappropriation at issue; the extent of the defen-
dant's efforts to obtain authorization for the unauthorized use or the basis for
her belief that authorization was unnecessary; how open and notorious the un-
authorized use was; and the amount of time that has passed since the unautho-
rized use was undertaken. These considerations could be weighed against
evidence that the use was calculated to be undiscovered or that defendant took
affirmative steps to prevent plaintiffs discovery of the unauthorized use.
200. See Heimes, supra note 77, at 1 ("In 2010, Kevin Antoine Dodson, a resident
of a housing project in Hunstville, Alabama, agreed to be interviewed by the
local television news after an intruder entered the home he shared with his
sister and her children. The news broadcasted quickly and went viral online, as
Mr. Dodson's look, style, and unique manner of speaking attracted the attention
of millions of people worldwide. Shortly thereafter, musicians and humorists
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A weighing-of-the-equities approach not only promotes IP social justice
by restraining IP Imperialist overreaching and supporting socially valuable
encroachments upon publicity rights, it is also consistent the Supreme
Court's directive in eBay v. Mercexchange, L.L.C.,2o1 that infringement upon
intellectual property rights does not automatically mandate injunctive re-
lief.202 This approach not only preserves an individual publicity plaintiff's
interests, but also serves to protect society's social interests as a whole. Un-
less the weighing of the equities mandates injunctive relief, the fact that the
equities in a particular case favor the right of the publicity plaintiff will not
preclude the unauthorized use of her persona altogether. Instead, consistent
with the Supreme Court's observations in Zacchini, it will merely assure her
a portion of the revenues generated by the unauthorized use.203
calling themselves The Gregory Brothers created a song known as the "Bed
Intruder Song" with an accompanying music video using clips from the televi-
sion broadcast. The song was one of the most viewed videos on YouTube,
quickly became a top iTunes download, and even rose to the Billboard maga-
zine's top 100 list. According to The Gregory Brothers, they agreed to share
some of the proceeds from their song's commercial success with Mr. Dodson.
Mr. Dodson obviously acquired instant fame and notoriety. He set up his own
website to receive donations and gamer additional publicity, and as a result has
purportedly raised enough money to move his family to a better house in a
safer neighborhood.").
201. 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006).
202. See e.g., Menell, Intellectual Property and the Property Rights Movement,
supra note 35, at 42 ("[Elven the Supreme Court's most stalwart property
rights defenders resisted the effort to pull intellectual property into the tradi-
tional property tent. In a unanimous decision ... the Court ruled that injunc-
tions should not be presumed in patent cases; rather courts should exercise
equitable discretion in determining relief."); see also Paul M. Janicke, Imple-
menting the "Adequate Remedy at Law "for Ongoing Patent Infringement After
eBay v. MercExchange, 51 IDEA 163 (2011).
203. See Kwall, supra note 82, at 65 (arguing for a monetary damages-only remedy
for certain right-of-publicity infringements).
In light of the substantial support for the imposition of a liability rule
approach in other areas of the law, it is surprising that this approach has
never been invoked in the context of adjudicating conflicts between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment. Indeed, resolution of this con-
flict is particularly suited to the imposition of a liability rule system since
many situations will arise in which the defendant's use is in the public
interest, but the plaintiff and defendant will be unable to negotiate pri-
vately an agreement permitting such use. The failure of these negotiations
may be attributable to factors such as the plaintiff's adamant refusal to sell
her persona, or the ability of the plaintiff to extract economic rents from
the buyer due to the relative uniqueness of the desired commodity. In
such instances, the adoption of a liability rule approach yields the most
economically efficient result.
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PART VI: CONCLUSION
It is high time that the bench and bar revisit the social mandate of the
Constitution that the intellectual property law promote the progress of the
arts and sciences and thereby serve the greater societal good:
Intellectual property rights are not merely technical matters.
They increasingly involve crucial questions not only of economic
interest, competitiveness, and market power, but also of environ-
mental sustainability, human development, ethics and interna-
tional human rights. We need to start using intellectual property
to reduce and eliminate hunger and poverty, to safeguard the envi-
ronment, to halt the loss of biodiversity, to empower women, and
to ensure food and social security.204
Courts adjudicating right-of-publicity disputes should carefully consider
the social utility goals underlying these rights, as they serve important social
goals and promote social justice as an element of the intellectual property
regime. Judicial recognition of the functional interdependence of right of
publicity social utility and social justice not only restrains socially unproduc-
tive IP Imperialism, but also promotes inclusion and participation in the IP
regime. The pursuit of such socially balanced applications of the intellectual
property law will only enhance the social benefits to be obtained through the
development of new intellectual properties and their exploitation in the digi-
tal information age.
204. Coombe, supra note 36, at 284.
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